The Permission to Narrate

Sahar

Feminists Naomi Wolf and Philis Chesler have recently been debating the topic of the ‘veil’ and Muslim women. It’s become somewhat of a heated debate with both sides claiming they have a better insight into the lives of Muslim women. This audacious insight of course does not actually rely on actual engagement with Muslim women, nor the participation of Muslim women in this debate– aside from brief references that are then interpreted and made to make sense through the position of both women.

Just a brief overview of the debate first:  Wolf’s experience in Morocco led her to make the following claim that Muslim women are not necessarily restricted by their religious attire (chador and headscarf) and in fact feel liberated, especially sexually. From these observations, Wolf calls for a more nuanced approach in understanding women’s freedom. Chesler has responded with the charge that Wolf is legitimizing oppressive practices and responds with outrageous statements that conclude with the following: Muslim women are oppressed in Islamic attire, they lack agency, and the Western approach to liberation is more fitting.

What interested me was the assumption of these women to debate the issue of the hijab (whatever forms of it) and the experiences of Muslim women without involving a practicing Muslim woman who observes the hijab or at least be a part of the community and faith that practices it,  and thus be more qualified on the subject.

Wolf attempts to recognise the opinions of Moroccan women and speaks on their experiences, but her own understanding of Islam, Muslim women or even the subject of Muslim dress seems to be too difficult for her when she confuses Pakistani dress (‘shalwar kameez’) with Moroccan Islamic dress which can come in the form of niqaab, abaya, jilbaba or just modestly dressed in loose pants/skirt/top and a headscarf.  So Wolf not only ignores the differences in cultural dress—for the Muslim world is just one monolithic entity anyway– these differences don’t really exist and can all fall under the category of ‘traditional dress’ conveniently juxtaposed against Western ‘modern dress’. By wearing any traditional Muslim dress (‘shalwar kazmeez’), Wolf thinks she has direct access to the experiences of Muslim women. Dress therefore becomes the embodiment of Muslim women’s lives, and a way to access their world.

As for Chesler, she too does not have much credibility (not that she does in the first place considering her inane islamophobic and racist views on Palestinians and Muslims as a whole) when she declares that ‘most’ Muslim girls and women are not given a choice in wearing any Islamic dress.  She supports her claims by shamelessly citing two women (Hirsi Ali and Nouri Darwish) who have publicly renounced Islam and have built their careers on feeding Islamophobic hysteria in the West.  So Muslim women are spoken for either through an Islamophobic feminist or apostates who work for right-wing American think tanks bent on demonizing Muslims and Islam.

Putting these absurdities aside, I also find it telling how the debate treats Muslim women as objects in an exhibition, as spectacles, who function as objects to be analysed, observed, dissected, commented and repackaged to be easily consumed by a Western audience. Muslim women’s voices are only heard through interpretation of two white women (the subject) who assume the permission to narrate what it is like to be a Muslim woman who chooses to cover her head, in whatever form.

The alienness of Muslim culture is retold in the language of universalism (western norms and feminist ideals) to ease the anxiety of the Western observer towards difference. We see this in how Wolf insists that there are similar sentiments behind Islamic dress that Western feminists can relate to “This may not be expressed in a traditional Western feminist set of images, but it is a recognisably Western feminist set of feelings”.  Or in the intimacy of Muslim homes, the presence of designer labels like Victoria Secret is comforting. Muslim mores are measured against white Western standards and only legitimised and accepted once shared values and practices are recognised. To send the reassuring message: “see, they are just like ‘us’”.

The notion of white being a signifier of objectivity is imperative here. Wolf, like the colonial traveler, is an objective observer who can participate in the local customs and wear the traditional dress– yet can remain ‘detached’ from her surrounding in order to make perceptive observations that can be taken away for examination.  Thus, both women’s subjectivities as white, upper-middle class Western women are not called into question when they speak on behalf of Muslim women in this debate. It is in fact this same subjectivity that permits them to narrate for Muslim women.  They speak with an unquestionable authority as whiteness has a moral-worth of its own masquerading as universal and never questioned.

So it is not that Muslim women are silenced by her hijab, as many white  feminists like to claim, but because they are made to be silent by those who wish to speak for them.

An Unwanted Spokeswoman

Sahar

I couldn’t help but laugh out loud when I read Mark Landler of The New York Times’ interview with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Reminiscent of a colonial-style arrogance, the brazen title of the interview, ‘Saving the World’s Woman—A New Gender Agenda’ set the mood of the interview.

In the interview, Clinton is asked a series of questions in which she highlights political, economic and social problems facing women  today, and what she considers  ‘solutions’.  We are given the impression that she wants to be remembered for her contribution in alleviating the problems women are facing.

I find it remarkable that Clinton– who assumes the role of spokeswoman for all women in the world—is talking about global women’s rights, while concurrently a part of a government that has wrought so much havoc on many in the developing countries specifically mentioned in the interview (India, Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq).

I wasn’t surprised by her attempt to present herself as a representative of women, considering she ran in the Presidential elections under such a rubric.  However, her policy stance on women seems disjointed and incongruous when you consider she is known for her hawkish stance on numerous issues like nuclear weapons and Iran, national security and the Israel-Palestine conflict. According to academic Stephen Zunes, she has opposed restrictions on U.S. arms transfers and police training to governments that have horrendous human rights violations like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Israel.  She has insisted upon unconditional funding for the disastrous and illegal war in Iraq and further increase in military spending.

Clinton asserts “ I happen to believe that the transformation of women’s roles is the last great impediment to universal progress — that we have made progress on many other aspects of human nature that used to be discriminatory bars to people’s full participation. But in too many places and too many ways, the oppression of women stands as a stark reminder of how difficult it is to realize people’s full human potential”.

Putting aside the contention of a normative discourse on universal human rights, theoretically, Clinton, like any Western leader, adheres to this liberal notion and stresses the importance of universal human rights, yet, she has questioned the credibility of known human rights organisations like Amnesty International when they’ve criticised the policies of the U.S. and its allies.  Moreover, she has also been an outspoken critic of the UN, opting for a unilateral stance in international politics.

She further states “Women and girls are a core factor in our foreign policy”—yet her historical record suggests either she is being disingenuous or is oblivious to the implications of her policies on women in particular.

Knowing the implications of war with Iran because of the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, she has eagerly continued with a hawkish stance on confronting Iran where in which she has described the Iranian ‘threat’ as unacceptable and suggesting a military strategy is possible. Early this year she vehemently defended the abhorrent Israeli invasion of Gaza which killed over 1000 civilians.  Just this month she has finalised a defense agreement with India to ensure US companies sell sophisticated arms to New Delhi.  Clinton states that she travels and talks about women’s rights and raises women’s concerns with leaders while simultaneously ensuring the imperial praxis remains.  It’s difficult to imagine how women’s lives are improved when she encourages and in fact openly endorses increasing militarism in countries like Pakistan, India, Iraq, Israel and Afghanistan—rather than on development to ensure political, economic and social stability. There is no mention of the structural mechanisms in place which generate North-South inequalities and maintain them via neo-liberal policies. These global economic policies create an unsafe environment for women and children who are vulnerable to war and poverty. Clinton would much rather blame women’s oppression on religious fundamentalism and global terrorism.

 “If you look at where we are fighting terrorism, there is a connection to groups that are making a stand against modernity, and that is most evident in their treatment of women”. What Clinton fails to understand, or purposely ignores is that the Islamic movements she is alluding  to are modernist movements which are resisting U.S. foreign policies in the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia. They are not simply resisting because of their hate of freedom, so the Bush administration mantra went—rather, they are modern in their own right and challenging a Western hegemony and a colonial modernity that is being imposed on them in the guise of economic exploitation and Western consumer culture.

With glaring audacity she continues,

“What does preventing little girls from going to school in Afghanistan by throwing acid on them have to do with waging a struggle against oppression externally?”

Clearly it’s in Clinton’s best interest as a representative of a government responsible for so many of the conflicts raging in many Muslim countries, to ignore the historical and political context in which women’s issues can be better understood.  The cultural violence that has ensued by Western countries in the ‘developing’ world harks back to colonialism and perpetuated today in similar policies of exploitation and domination.  The throwing of acid can only be understood within such a context in order to read it accurately as a response to the encroachment on national sovereignty and the cultural life of these people—where women often are seen as the cultural/national symbol. Thus, instability ensures women become a prime target of preserving what is perceived to be cultural losses.

If Clinton was genuine about wanting to help women (which I certainly doubt she is) she should– along with her ‘white sisters’– stop basking in the colonial glory of ‘saving’ women in developing countries.  Instead, she should acknowledge her complicity in ensuring that current oppressive political and economic structures remain, which reinforces a dichotomy of power and powerless that has had disastrous effects on global politics, particularly on the lives of women. But I wouldn’t hold my breath on that one.

It’s Barbie’s World.

Farah

Turns out Melbourne will soon be host to ‘Forever Barbie’ – an exhibition which “celebrates 50 years of a pop culture icon.” I’ve had my fair share of Barbie dolls when I was younger but an exhibition? Since when did Barbie become an appropriate ‘cultural’ artefact to celebrate?

The critiques against Barbie are well known; she is a commodification of the “feminine” and symbolises and perpetuates (white) standards of beauty. Barbie constructs a certain reality of femininity, one in which her consumers by extension participate. Barbie exists to consume. She pairs endless consumption with the attainment of a particular beauty standard. Capitalist tools don’t get better than her. You can read more in “Barbie Culture” by Mary Frances Rogers.

Later, it was decided to give Barbie some ethnic friends. Through these later dolls Mattel reinforced the white standard of beauty by reduce cultural difference to costume changes and different colours of plastic. One of the highlights is “Princess Moroccan Barbie” and another Barbie Mattel created (which I can’t find a picture of) called “Leyla” who apparently was made to be a 1720’s Turkish Muslim slave girl.

Princess Morrocan Barbie

These dolls demonstrate how a certain type of the Other is created and promoted through the white, female body of plastic Barbie. Thanks Mattel. I feel sufficiently included within your capitalist gaze.

Now, we have Fulla who is marketed as a Muslim doll. She represents a ‘culturally sensitive alternative to Barbie’s flashy lifestyle.’ She isn’t made by Mattel but by a Syrian based company (called NewBoy) though she does have physical similarities to her white American counterpart (11” tall, can’t stand up, and both are made in the same factories in China). Fulla has “outdoor” and “indoor” clothes; her outdoor clothes include a hijab, a black abaya, or a long, cream coat.

Fulla

Her indoor clothes includes trendy, Western-style outfits. She also comes with a mini pink prayer mat. Fulla herself has long black hair, large brown eyes, painted on eyebrows, and an olive-like complexion (some of the images I’ve seen on the internet range from dark to as white as Barbie). She also has two ‘friends’; blonde-haired Yasmine and red-haired Nada. The
story was picked up in the media.

In her article “Islamic Barbie: The Politics of Gender and Performativity” Amina Yaqin discusses Razanne, a Muslim doll (again similar to Barbie) made by a Muslim couple in the US and sold through their website. Razanne is different to Fulla in that she doesn’t have ‘friends’ but you can get her in different ‘ethnicities’ – Fair Skin/Fair Hair, Olive Skin/Dark Hair or Dark Skin/Dark Hair. Like Fulla, Razanne has “inside” and “outside” fashion. At home, Razanne dresses in all the latest fashion, and when she wants to go out she wears her hijab and jilbaab. Yaqin argues that dolls like Razanne and Fulla to a certain extent present an alternative conception of Muslim identity because the dolls are presented as a substitute to the culture of commodification. However, she concludes that it arguable whether the dolls break stereotyped representation of Muslim women, or whether the dolls reinforce stereotypes through the universalizing of a female Muslim subject. She rightly argues Razanna is a ‘veiled mimicry’ of Barbie.

So do Fulla and Razanne represent “protest products” made to resist Western consumer culture? Or, as Katie Cercone argues, are Fulla and Razanna (like their white Barbie counterparts) “emblem[s] of the cultural pressure to conform to one extremely limiting female role?” Renée Terrebonne takes up this point in her article “Fulla, the veiled Barbie: An analysis of cultural imperialism and agency”. Like Yaqin she argues that Fulla is a capitalist cultural artifact through her existence as a mime of Barbie. But she also argues that Fulla is “Barbie done differently to fit the needs of a group of people.” The consumer takes the globalised artifact (Barbie) and makes it local (Fulla). The capitalist icon is transformed, and is a complicated mimesis. It’s a positive step for Barbie and Barbie-like dolls everywhere.

I’ve always been a bit skeptical about the ‘glocalisation’ argument. McDonalds usually trots it out to make the claim that they “respect” other cultures by offering halal Big Macs. In this case I think it is important to realise while dolls like Fulla and Razanne do offer an alternative to Barbie, the doll is still inherently consumerist and constructs its own discourse of femininity. For example, take Razanne. While she is offered in different colours to ‘represent’ different ethnicities, the different dolls have exactly the same features, but are just slightly different colours. Fulla is created in the same factory in China as Barbie, and looks nearly exactly like Barbie just with slightly larger eyes and a slightly darker complexion. And none of them can actually stand up properly!

To a large extent Islam is being commodified to sell the doll. Fulla has started off a craze in the Middle East; you can get Fulla chewing gum, bags and bicycles, matching clothes, and a matching pink prayer rug for her young owner. A comment by a toy-store owner in Syria

Fulla CD player plus sing-a-long karaoke set

(quoted in a New York Times article got my attention. “”If you’ve got a TV in the house, it’s Fulla all the time,” she said.”The parents complain about the expense. But Fulla gives girls a more Islamic character to emulate, and parents want that.”

So capitalism’s ok as long as it teaches the kiddies? Forgive me if I want something other than a doll to teach my (potential) daughter my religious and cultural values.

This is a commercial for Fulla. It’s in Arabic, but watch it and try to spot all the Fulla merchandise: she’s praying on her signature pink rug, when on the phone to her friend she waves about a Fulla photo album, she uses Fulla cake mix to bake her friend a (Fulla brand) cake which is then decorated in her signature jasmine flower motif, she uses Fulla plates, she sleeps in Fulla bed sheets. In the end, glocalisation isn’t about finding the ‘agency’ of consumers in globalisation – it’s about Barbie done differently to sell more stuff.

One writer at the Guardian probably sums it up, “For parents it will be the same story regardless: an empty wallet and a houseful of small plastic people with fixed smiles and moulded matching accessories.”

Islam, CEDAW and International Law

Farah

In the past few years I’ve noticed a disturbing trend. Now I don’t have a problem with trends. Trends are fun, they make me cool, and that means I can relate to the young people. The problem is with this new trend is that its called “Let’s Obsess about Human Rights.” The other problem with this trend is that every time it rears its god ugly head its accompanied by its really, really irritating friend “Don’t worry about engaging in critical dialogue with human rights because then you might just realise it’s a load of crap.” I don’t really have a problem with human rights in principle… alright, I do. Actually, this whole post is all about the main issue that I have with women’s rights in particular (codified in the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women – CEDAW). Specifically, the fact that international law is an ineffective tool within which to realise women’s rights, especially when in relation to Islamic states. There are two main issues which have not been wholly reconciled within the literature. With this limitations in mind, it is argued that norms and principles for the empowerment of women are more stable and fundamental when adopted freely from within the state. Any determined project for the empowerment of women must be addressed from a bottom-up approach.

Firstly, women’s rights discourse is rooted in western feminist’s assumption that the oppression of women in Islamic states is solely attributable to the culture and to Islam. They argue (in response to the concerns of cultural relativism) that basing rights discourse on differing cultural values will undermine women’s rights because certain ‘undesireable’ elements of the culture are antithetical to women’s rights. ‘Oppressive’ cultural practices must be rejected before progress can be achieved. This assumption that discrimination is rooted in culture is reflected in CEDAW at Article 5(a). It states:

5. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures:

(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices … and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women;

Blaming the culture undermines the substantial evidence that the disenfranchisement of women is rooted in economic and social conditions. (For a fuller discussion on this point I’ll direct you to read Sahar’s post “Women and Culture”) Within the context of CEDAW and international law it is important to note that this approach is attempting to initiate top-down ‘cultural’ change and ignores the wider economic and social problems which contribute to the injustices against women. What is needed is grass-roots change; Muslim women must examine the justifications for, and the extent to which, the system have been corrupted by the influence of colonialism and current social and political conditions. There are a number of contemporary Muslim women’s organisations that are actively engaging in such a dialogue. Their efforts in engaging with rights discourse on their own terms are hampered by Western feminists (and CEDAW) who insist on culture-blaming and thus deny the Muslim women her agency. At best, the role that treaties like CEDAW can play is as pieces of public persuasion that may help grass-roots activists and politicians eager to promote a process of domestic reform.

The next point that I think needs to be addressed a lot more critically within the literature on human rights is its status as international law. Regardless of what journalists love to claim when pointing fingers at other cultures, human rights is not customary international law and states are not under an obligation to protect and promote those rights. Additionally, enforcement of human rights is also an issue that needs to be addressed. It is difficult to use enforcement mechanisms available for breaches of international law to enforce breaches of human rights. The traditional rules regarding accountability, state responsibility and enforcement are based on essentially reciprocal rights and obligations like those found in international law generally. These enforcement mechanisms operate horizontally and are subject to the political will of individual states. Human rights discourse sits uneasily within this framework. Admittedly, there has been vigorous development of treaty-based human rights law, like CEDAW, which have specific committees to investigate claims of breaches brought by individuals. However, the treaty regime presents an ad-hoc approach to human rights which ultimately undermines its claims to ‘universality’. Additionally, access to those committees is contingent on states granting their citizens access. Individuals have no status in international law. The fundamental driving force in the development of all international law remains the sovereign State.

By highlighting the two issues above regarding women’s rights I have tried to establish that the protection of human rights is a process which depends largely upon strengthening internal institutions, structures and procedures for challenging violations and denials of rights. Governments must develop civil society to ensure that the social and economic conditions aid the enfranchisement of women. Empower grass-roots women’s rights organisations to re-interpret the role of women in their society. None of these happen over night. Change takes time. And even though time isn’t something that a lot of women have, for the rights to be meaningful and fundamental change to occur, people need to wait.

Empty vessels make the loudest noise

Muslimah Media Watch recently covered a discussion between Senior analyst with Gallup and Director of Gallup and Muslim studies, Dalia Mogahed; and journalist and author, Irshad Manji. I had heard this discussion before, however, when I read MMW’s piece on it, I decided to share a few thoughts, because Sobia’s take on the discussion differed from my own. I’m a bit disappointed Sobia’s piece remained ‘neutral’ in its coverage of the discussion—opting to point out how nice it is to have diverse opinions in the community. While it’s important to demonstrate a myriad of views within the female Muslim community– we’re indeed in need of them, however, it’s another to legitimise the voices of those like Manji. Sobia from MMW did not seem to understand the fine line between the two. Let me explain.

The debate began with Manji’s atrocious Arabic pronunciation of ‘assalamu’ alaikum’, which sounded more like American slang, than an Islamic greeting. It didn’t do much for Manji’s credibility, I tell you. It was clear from the outset that Manji was out of her league. Mogahed was knowledgeable both in Islam, its politics and the reality of Western Muslims and their experiences. She could draw on all three in order to give credence and illustrate her answers and refutations. Unlike Manji, who solely relied on personal experiences and abstract references to Islamic history. In sum, Mogahed destroyed Manji with her level of knowledge and empirical evidence. Now I’m not saying that those who are less informed should not be discussing Islam, hell, we all do it. However, there are dangers in expressing views in a public setting without actually having the knowledge to support yourself. In the case of Manji, this becomes even more problematic considering the post-911 context.

What do we know about Manji? She’s an author of the book “The trouble with Islam today” (originally titled “The trouble with Islam” which she was wisely told to change). She is also President of “Project ijtihad” which builds closer relations between “reformed-minded Muslims” and non-Muslims. Reading her book, one immediately realises it’s nothing more than a regurgitation of already circulated criticism of Islam, often from the voices of Christians, atheists and politicians. Like in this debate, she uses it to praise herself and how courageous she is being for making such criticisms. I think it’s healthy to question your belief and practices, but there has to be a foundation of understanding where criticism is being made. Also, there’s a difference between slander and criticism, which Manji too often conflates in her book and articles.

Manji’s book, and this debate for that matter, clearly illustrates she has little knowledge of Islam, but chooses to resort to popular arguments (Islam’s oppression of women etc). For instance, her definition of Sharia law was very selective she defines it as nothing more than “legal opinions” of classical jurists that have been repeated since the imperial period. There is no mention of how these opinions were derived, its close association with the Quran and Sunnah. Importantly, there’s no understanding that Sharia is a dynamic tool; used in multiple ways depending on individual cases. Judith Tucker’s book In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine’ extensively shows how Sharia was used in 17th and 18th century Palestine and Syria, where she concludes how the law was very fluid and flexible. It’s also quite interesting how there is very little references to Islamic text to support Manji’s accusations against Islam. Page after page lacking footnotes. The little references to history and text she has the courage to use is often distorted to fit her political agenda: To undermine Islam, to reinforce a euro-centric understanding of Islam, to reassert her position of a “reformist thinker”, to legitimise Islamophobia, and so on.

This panel/debate wasn’t the only one I seen Manji on; and it’s interesting that she is always placed against more ‘orthodox’ and scholarly people—whether its history, politics, or Islam that’s the subject. For example, the well-known debate with political scientist Angry Arab cleverly reinforces the dichotomy that Manji and her supporters would prefer: Manji, the informed reformist who is subverting the ‘evils’ in orthodox Islam accentuated by who she speaks against. This could be the Angry Arab character, who it is mistakenly implied, is sympathetic towards the “inherent violence” in Islam and the Muslim world (because he understands the imperial game) or the more traditional speaker who uses Islamic scholarship, the Quran and hadiths to support their claim.

To have someone like Manji on the same panel debating Mogahed, the implication here is Manji’s views have equal weight to Islamic scholarship, or anyone with a good grasp of historical and political realities in the Muslim world.

Which brings me to my next problem with Manji: her politics. Manji has become renown for her criticism of the Muslim world, in particular the Arab Palestinians. She actually reminds me of the hilarious critic of Islam, Wafa Sultan, also known for her polemics– where she too has made a career out of criticising Islam and the Muslim world for its ‘backwardness’, ‘violence’ etc. Apparently psychiatry just wasn’t providing her enough of an income. Both have argued that the problem is not the West, but Muslims and Islam. It is Muslims and Islam that need to change and appreciate the ‘benevolence’ of the West, they argue. Indeed, Muslims should take responsibility for some of the problems in our community. I personally have a habit of pointing this out. However, they both conveniently ignore the role of colonialism and its imperial presence today, where we have been witnessed to an economic, cultural and political domination. This seems to escape Manji especially. In fact, Manji is a huge supporter of Israel, a state which has since its establishment in 1948, has shown complete disregard for human rights, the Geneva Conventions and other international agreements of civilised nations. It has subsequently subjected Palestinians to systematic oppression and continues to do so without a care in the world. Manji has gone as far to say that Israel serves as a “model” for the Arab and Muslim world to emulate.

Therefore, Manji’s political views and her views on Islam cannot simply be treated as mutually exclusive. Sobia states Manji “very often is viewed as speaking for or about Muslims, whether some Muslims like it or not, her inclusion in the debate also seemed appropriate”. Considering Manji’s political views, I must ask, who is it more appropriate for?

Sobia also half-heartedly admits Mogahed did a tad better. Which I thought a bit surprising, because it was obvious to the listener; she refuted everything Manji said (even if Manji’s point was irrelevant) while Manji failed to do the same. Little digs and comic references do not constitute a good answer! Sobia also writes “Manji mainly relied on personal experiences, which are valid and credible in and of themselves”. Whaaaaat? In an attempt to support diverse opinions within the community, Sobia has come too close to legitimise not only the polemics of Manji, but also argue that Manji’s reliance on personal experience (where a lot of her theories are premised on) are just as valid as reliance on Islamic scholarship, general Muslim opinion (via polling etc) and religious text. Sure, personal experience varies and that should be something we consider, however, in a discussion like this, where issues of terrorism, women and Islam, critical thinking in Islamic scholarship, etc are being discussed, Manji’s personal experience cannot be used as explanation, illustrations and refutations. In fact, by acknowledging the validity of personal experiences I am curious what Sobia has to say about renowned critic of Islam Hirsi Ali (whom by the way Manji has closely worked with). Hirsi Ali has taken her personal experience in an abusive marriage to a Muslim man and homogenised it as typical of women’s experience in Islam. Now, as an atheist, she has waged war on Islam.

So Manji can continue throwing in little self-aggrandizing stories of being praised for her views, her mysterious conversations with unknown or unnamed shiekhs and so on; it comes nowhere near to reflecting a more accurate view, which was what Mogahed’s research was based on. I love one particular tactic Manji employs, and that is her insistence she receives emails from young Muslims expressing their support. Now, that may be true, that she probably does receive emails from some young Muslims, but I have my doubts that they’re anything more than a handful. I don’t know of ANY Muslim, from the most ‘traditional’ to the most ‘liberal’ who have taken a liking to Manji. In fact, they despise her. If not for her religious views, than definitely for her political views. It is her attempt to legitimise her voice. In reality, she, like Ali, is the apple of the Western political plutocracy’s eyes. The climate is ripe for Manjis, Alis and Sultans, and it is little wonder their voices are inflated to an importance that is undeserving.

In light of this, it is not surprising, as a Muslim woman who studies, and is passionate about women’s issues in Islam and politics, I can safely say, Manji-the self professed feminist, certainly does not speak for me.

- Sahar

Mernissi on Al-Ghazali

Recently Muslimah Media Watch discussed a topic on sexuality and made a common mistake which I believe is worth stressing. The author referred to Al-Ghazali’s theory of sexuality through the reference made by Fatima Mernissi’s ‘Beyond the Veil’ (1987). The author rightly points out how Women scholars of Islam are often accused of being biased and therefore conveniently discredited. Indeed, one must acknowledge the biased tendencies in all authors, whether male or female. However, that doesn’t mean to ignore those of female authors so to not risk the charge their writings are unfairly being discredited!

What’s unfortunate about Mernissi is her own experiences do to an extent influence her scholarship. Her personal experience of living in a Moroccan harem in the 1940s and having been subjected to misogynistic attitudes from the male-dominated and quite segregated community she was raised in, she reads this back into the works of Islamic scholarship to explain her own unfortunate experiences. Furthermore, she attempts to homogenize her experience to mean the experiences of all Muslim women.

What’s problematic with Mernissi being used as an indirect reference to Ghazali is that the author instead uses Mernissi’s interpretation or should I say distortion of Ghazali. It’s a harsh accusation to make of Mernissi, however, once reading her book, it becomes clear how she completely manipulates Ghazali’s understanding of sexuality. I’ll refer to a few examples, although there are many throughout her book. Mernissi writes Ghazali sees civilization as “Struggling to contain women’s destructive, all absorbing power. Women must be controlled to prevent men from being distracted from their social and religious duties. Society can survive only by creating institutions that foster male dominance through sexual segregation and polygamy for believers.

She thus argues that contemporary Muslim thinking has been influenced by Ghazali here and gives credence and justification for the dangers of women being active in the public space. Moreover, women should be ‘controlled’ to prevent men from being distracted from their religious and spiritual duties. Mernissi concludes that the “entire Muslim social structure can be seen as an attack on, and a defense against, the disruptive power of female sexuality”.

However, Mernissi’s attack comes with no direct references to his work. Instead, she’d rather write paragraph after paragraph of her own version of Ghazali. If one actually reads what Ghazali has to say about sexuality, it would immediately become clear that nowhere in Ghazali’s work does he specifically talk about women’s sexuality when he discusses sexual desire or sexuality. In ‘Marriage and Sexuality in Islam’ and ‘Breaking the two desires’ Ghazali is concerned with the virtue of both men and women and is in fact talking about sexual desire for both men and women and how excessiveness can lead a Muslim away from their spiritual journey. In the latter book he writes “sexual desire contains evils which may destroy both religion and the world if it is not controlled and subjugated, and restored to a state of equilibrium”. As Katherine Bullock rightly points out in her brilliant critique of Mernissi from her book ‘Rethinking Muslim Women and the Veil’ (2003) Ghazali here is referring to sexual desire in general, or even more so, male desire considering he’s writing for them. This is not surprising considering Ghazali was a sufi and this emphasis on spiritual gross and moderation is in accordance with his Sufi beliefs.

Mernissi completely ignores Ghazali’s sufi direction here. Although Ghazali has a clear male bias in other areas of Islam, one cannot say this about his ideas on sexuality. Considering how he stresses the importance for husbands to ensure their wives sexual pleasures are met, this line of thinking was advanced for his time.

I recommend Katherine Bullock’s ‘Rethinking Muslim Women and the Veil’ for further insight into Mernissi’s distortion.

 

-Sahar