Princess Hijab

Farah

I was going to write a response to this article by Phyllis Chesler. Her article contains gems of wisdom like “most Muslim girls and women are impoverished and wear rags” and “I am told that the Saudis fly in fresh planeloads of Parisian prostitutes every week.” But I’m getting a little tired of repeating the same arguments over and over. Instead, I want to write about Princess Hijab, the creation of a Parisian guerrilla street artist. Princess Hijab uses the imagery of the niqab to subvert commercial imagery by drawing then onto billboards and posters, and also tags with her ‘Hijab-ad’ prints.

In an interview at Menassat Princess Hijab cites a number of different influences on her work, including “the Woman. No logo from Naomi Klein, The anti-advertising movement… the gender movements… the straight edge, the nerd-centrism, atheism symbolism, urban legends, the allegories and the new myths.” I remember reading No Logo eight years ago; I think it was probably the first (proper) non-fiction book I had read (well, it was either that or Merinissi’s The Veil and the Male Elite – I can’t really remember that far back anymore). I’m not sure if I understood it all back at 15 (so, so long ago) but it was a big wake up. Later at uni I would re-visit and (badly) write about one of the central topics of Klein’s book: what she refers to as “semiotic Robin Hoodism”: culture jamming.

Culture jamming seeks to hijack and politicise the message of mass culture’s main language: advertisements. Adbusters is probably the most well-known organisation (whether or not they continue to uphold their same principles is debatable) and like the stuff Adbusters do Princess Hijab’s art does share a critique of mass culture and consumerism. But, Princess Hijab “does not subvert images in an American way.” Which I can understand – culture jamming I’ve seen is largely ignorant of non-Western experiences. Her approach is unique because she infuses her art with an identity politics; she appropriates an image used by mass culture to symbolise oppression and subjugation and subverts it to challenge dominant constructs of women, Islam and femininity.

In her own words, “Princess Hijab knows that L’Oréal and Dark & Lovely have been killing her little by little. She feels that the veil is no longer that white. She feels contaminated … By day, she wears a white veil, symbol of purity. By night, her black veil is the expression of her vengeful fight for a cause.” She states she isn’t linked to any political ideology or group, but it’s hard to deny the relationship between art, culture and power evident through her work. Through her art she creates sites of resistance both disruptive and creative: sites where opposition can be mounted but also where the viewer can meaningfully engage with the content.

One of the criticisms of her art is that it is too simplistic to offer an alternative to the ideology of mass culture. But I think the criticism is unwarranted –We all use discursive techniques in which we’re fluent; for me its writing. For Princess Hijab it’s taking an image used to symbolize oppression, appropriating it and using it to represent something entirely different – a meaning we have to construct for ourselves. And culture jamming relies on the immediacy of the image and the interaction between viewer and viewed.

Advertising renders nearly anything a brand; it mines culture for its ideas, representations and forms. And in this era of visual marketing, Princess Hijab explores notions of public space and representation, challenging ideological constructs and representations with her distinctive imagery. Her work is an example of how semiotic guerrilla warfare can be used to counter the symbolist imagery adopted by mass culture.

Whether you realise it or not, you are in the midst of a culture war. The key element in the forthcoming struggle will be a battle for domination of key concept areas. It is necessary for us to predict future developments and invest our energies in ‘fringe’ activities where we judge that the issues will become key ones at a later date. Not only issues but the very language is used to formulate the debate must reflect our thinking. If we cannot yet produce our own culture (which we shall strive towards), we should seek to act as a perceptual filter for the mass culture which surrounds us.

Counter Culture helps you win.

Excerpt from An Anthology of Counter Culture edited by Peter Harrington, Tim Bragg and Terry Burgoyne.

A Desire To Look

Sahar

Unfortunately I’m extremely busy at the moment so could not write an entire piece on this list of the the hottest Muslim women  in the world , but Muslima Media Watch  has written a good post on it so check it out.  I myself could not help but make a comment on the politics of this list.

I had no idea most of these women were Muslim–mainly because they do not stress this aspect of their identity so much;  to have them on this list was somewhat baffling. It was disturbing to note their inviting poses and their nudity.  I’m reminded of European colonialism’s insatiable desire to unveil the Muslim woman, due to its obsession with looking. The colonised world was an exhibition for the European gaze, and the native as a spectacle.  The veiled Muslim woman of this period frustrated Europeans because she violated their right to look and undermined their world of exhibition.  Moreover, she refused to be exposed, made vulnerable–her existence dissected by white eyes.  Importantly, she could look without being seen and this politicised her presence.

It was not a surprise then that the veiled Muslim woman became a focus of both the coloniser’s quest to unveil and thus dominate her (by extension the Muslim society to which she belonged to) –and a symbol of national resistance.  

The Europeans in turn demonized the veil– or in today’s context–the hijab.  They forced her to unveil, to show them what she was hiding. In revenge, they unveiled her in paintings where her body was laid bare for them to see. She was also photographed in the same way. These paintings and photographs were disseminated throughout Europe and evoked sexual imagery of a feminised Orient being penetrated by a lustful Europe.

The message was clear: The exotic woman of the Orient had given herself up for the white man. She would be saved from the brutality of her world which the veil became a metaphor for.

This list of Muslim women, with not one of them in hijab, exoticised and nude,  is a modern attempt to possess the Muslim woman. In fact, the article on the list of Muslim women ends with the reminder “And the good news is, you can look at them any time of day…”.  There is a sense of excitement in it because the Muslim woman is available for them to see, and there are no barriers (veil). Such an attempt is made even more apparent in that it is a supposed ‘celebration’ of the holy month of Ramadan for Muslims.  By exposing her to the Western gaze a similar message is being sent: the Muslim woman is under the control of Western capitalism. She has been unveiled and objectified,  and here lies the real attraction of such a list.

An Unwanted Spokeswoman

Sahar

I couldn’t help but laugh out loud when I read Mark Landler of The New York Times’ interview with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Reminiscent of a colonial-style arrogance, the brazen title of the interview, ‘Saving the World’s Woman—A New Gender Agenda’ set the mood of the interview.

In the interview, Clinton is asked a series of questions in which she highlights political, economic and social problems facing women  today, and what she considers  ‘solutions’.  We are given the impression that she wants to be remembered for her contribution in alleviating the problems women are facing.

I find it remarkable that Clinton– who assumes the role of spokeswoman for all women in the world—is talking about global women’s rights, while concurrently a part of a government that has wrought so much havoc on many in the developing countries specifically mentioned in the interview (India, Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq).

I wasn’t surprised by her attempt to present herself as a representative of women, considering she ran in the Presidential elections under such a rubric.  However, her policy stance on women seems disjointed and incongruous when you consider she is known for her hawkish stance on numerous issues like nuclear weapons and Iran, national security and the Israel-Palestine conflict. According to academic Stephen Zunes, she has opposed restrictions on U.S. arms transfers and police training to governments that have horrendous human rights violations like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Israel.  She has insisted upon unconditional funding for the disastrous and illegal war in Iraq and further increase in military spending.

Clinton asserts “ I happen to believe that the transformation of women’s roles is the last great impediment to universal progress — that we have made progress on many other aspects of human nature that used to be discriminatory bars to people’s full participation. But in too many places and too many ways, the oppression of women stands as a stark reminder of how difficult it is to realize people’s full human potential”.

Putting aside the contention of a normative discourse on universal human rights, theoretically, Clinton, like any Western leader, adheres to this liberal notion and stresses the importance of universal human rights, yet, she has questioned the credibility of known human rights organisations like Amnesty International when they’ve criticised the policies of the U.S. and its allies.  Moreover, she has also been an outspoken critic of the UN, opting for a unilateral stance in international politics.

She further states “Women and girls are a core factor in our foreign policy”—yet her historical record suggests either she is being disingenuous or is oblivious to the implications of her policies on women in particular.

Knowing the implications of war with Iran because of the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, she has eagerly continued with a hawkish stance on confronting Iran where in which she has described the Iranian ‘threat’ as unacceptable and suggesting a military strategy is possible. Early this year she vehemently defended the abhorrent Israeli invasion of Gaza which killed over 1000 civilians.  Just this month she has finalised a defense agreement with India to ensure US companies sell sophisticated arms to New Delhi.  Clinton states that she travels and talks about women’s rights and raises women’s concerns with leaders while simultaneously ensuring the imperial praxis remains.  It’s difficult to imagine how women’s lives are improved when she encourages and in fact openly endorses increasing militarism in countries like Pakistan, India, Iraq, Israel and Afghanistan—rather than on development to ensure political, economic and social stability. There is no mention of the structural mechanisms in place which generate North-South inequalities and maintain them via neo-liberal policies. These global economic policies create an unsafe environment for women and children who are vulnerable to war and poverty. Clinton would much rather blame women’s oppression on religious fundamentalism and global terrorism.

 “If you look at where we are fighting terrorism, there is a connection to groups that are making a stand against modernity, and that is most evident in their treatment of women”. What Clinton fails to understand, or purposely ignores is that the Islamic movements she is alluding  to are modernist movements which are resisting U.S. foreign policies in the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia. They are not simply resisting because of their hate of freedom, so the Bush administration mantra went—rather, they are modern in their own right and challenging a Western hegemony and a colonial modernity that is being imposed on them in the guise of economic exploitation and Western consumer culture.

With glaring audacity she continues,

“What does preventing little girls from going to school in Afghanistan by throwing acid on them have to do with waging a struggle against oppression externally?”

Clearly it’s in Clinton’s best interest as a representative of a government responsible for so many of the conflicts raging in many Muslim countries, to ignore the historical and political context in which women’s issues can be better understood.  The cultural violence that has ensued by Western countries in the ‘developing’ world harks back to colonialism and perpetuated today in similar policies of exploitation and domination.  The throwing of acid can only be understood within such a context in order to read it accurately as a response to the encroachment on national sovereignty and the cultural life of these people—where women often are seen as the cultural/national symbol. Thus, instability ensures women become a prime target of preserving what is perceived to be cultural losses.

If Clinton was genuine about wanting to help women (which I certainly doubt she is) she should– along with her ‘white sisters’– stop basking in the colonial glory of ‘saving’ women in developing countries.  Instead, she should acknowledge her complicity in ensuring that current oppressive political and economic structures remain, which reinforces a dichotomy of power and powerless that has had disastrous effects on global politics, particularly on the lives of women. But I wouldn’t hold my breath on that one.

Lubna Ahmed al-Hussein, Angela Merkel and “well built” female lawyers

Farah

One of the commenters on my burka ban post a couple of weeks ago led me to the story of Lubna Ahmed al-Hussein – a Sudanese journalist who was arrested along with 11 other women in a Khartoum café for breaking Sudanese indecency laws by wearing trousers. While 10 of her companions have pleaded guilty to the offence, al-Hussein has decided to challenge the law. She has come out quite strongly against the indecency laws, and has declared that she is willing to take her case to the highest court in Sudan and, if they do not rule in her favour, she is willing to be lashed “not 40, but 40,000 times”.

She was quoted in the Guardian as saying, “Islam does not say whether a woman can wear trousers or not … It is not about religion, it is about men treating women badly.” Similarly, in her article “Lubna, a case of subduing a woman’s body” published in Al-Horreya newspaper shortly after al-Hussein’s arrest Sudanese journalist Amal Habbani also highlights that this law and the treatment of al-Hussein was “not about fashion but a political tactic to intimidate and terrorize opponents.” Habbani has since been charged and fined by the government after the article was published.

Sudan has a long history of women’s activism, and the strong support Sudanese women and men have given Al-Hussein has been highlighted over the past weeks. This activism stretches back to the 1989 coup that put the NIF in power. In “Gender Politics and Islamization in Sudan” Sondra Hale highlights that women were at the forefront of the 1989 coup. She notes that women were far more than “the ‘Greek chorus’ of the Islamic revolution. They [were] the central organizers and socializers … these women were not only learning and interpreting Islam for themselves and other women, but were also militant, independent in spirit, and effective organizers in the movement.” Leaders like Hasan al-Turabi came out in strong support of the role of women in the new Sudan, including in his pamphlet “On the Position of Women in Islam and in Islamic Society” published in 1973. But Hale questions whether or not women can sustain such an activist role now that the NIF is consolidating their control. Take for example the indecency laws. They are a part of a broader campaign in which women are re-socialized and religious ideas and institutions manipulated to form new power relationships. But the campaign verges on essentializing Islam; women’s behavior in the name of the ‘ideal woman’ is being ideologically manipulated by male-controlled religio-political institutions.

Lubna Ahmed al-Hussein. Image via Sudan Tribune

The focus is solely been on her right to wear trousers, while ignoring the broader issue. This approach is adopted by the articles I found trawling through my Google search. People say sarcasm is the lowest form of wit, but honestly I think that award should go to the pun. Some of the more (lamer) article titles I came across were:

• “al-Hussein wears the pants”
• “Lubna Hussein, standing up to Sudanese law on who wears the pants”
and other predictable variations on “Guess who wear’s the pants”, “blah blah pants wearing”. Alternatively, there was
• “Fashion statement: A Sudanese woman risks a flogging over pants” (fashion statement? Really?)
• “Lubna Hussein makes an ass of the law”
• “Trouser martyr”
• “Martyr to her trousers”
which is probably a bit much – she’s not dead so can we lay off the martyr talk?

Discussions of appropriate clothing are certainly not restricted to Muslim women. In 2006 Australian judge Peter Young said that some ‘well built’ female lawyers wore inappropriately revealing clothing. In an opinion piece, he stated “It is clear that some female solicitors have no idea of appropriate court dress. The worst offenders are usually well-built women who expose at least the upper halves of their breasts, and as they lean forward to make a point to a judge sitting at a high level they present a most unwelcome display of bare flesh.” The opinion of a respected member of society in a country where supposedly ‘democratic’ values prevail – and that was only a couple of years ago. More recently (and when I say recent I mean yesterday) German Chancellor Angela Merkel and politician Vera Lengsfeld (both members of the conservative party) have come under fire for publishing an election ad campaign where both wore low-cut dresses which showed ample amounts of cleavage – apparently the ad lowered the tone of the election and was ‘inappropriate’.

While Merkel, Lengsfeld and all those well-built female lawyers aren’t breaking laws, people’s attitudes remain the same. I’m not downplaying the significance of al-Hussein’s situation; there is a concern she could be flogged and I don’t agree with laws that prosecute against ‘indecent’ clothing, whether that clothing is trousers or burqas. But the issue here is a lot bigger than just a right to wear pants and focussing on that right alone obscures the broader issue. In a second article called “Alienation and Belonging—Women’s Citizenship and Emanciation: Visions for Sudan’s Post-Islamist Future”, Hale notes that “one of the unanswered questions … is why women are … superficially on the agenda … and, yet, a vision for what a gender egalitarian society would look like is glossed over or ignored.” The right of a woman to control her own body emerges in a number of contexts in all countries in a number of areas, including right to wear clothing free from legal constraints. These issues relate to broader questions about the role of women. What is deemed appropriate/inappropriate in certain contexts? Do we have a right to dictate by law the choices women make? And what type of national identity is being dictated to women, and being constructed over our bodies?

While we wait for an answer to those questions, I want to start a campaign. Not about al-Hussein – she already has ample support both in Sudan and across the world (Sarkozy has even jumped on the bandwagon). My campaign? Free Merkel and Lengsfeld’s cleavage from our traditional and backward attitudes. Do you want a society in which your daughter can’t show off her cleavage (if she has any, and if she doesn’t she can always get implants – not that I’m suggesting your daughter conform to a particular standard of beauty)? Come on people, do it for the kids.

The ‘enemy’ within: Muslims in France

Sahar

It seems France hasn’t had sufficient amount of negative attention. News has been buzzing on the latest debate over dress in the country. French President Nicolas Sarkozy has set up a commission to study the wearing of burqa in France—a long garment that covers the entire body including the face. According to Sarkozy, the burqa “deprived women of identity” and believes it is unacceptable to have women in France as “prisoners behind netting”.

Nor is Sarkozy alone in such sentiments. French feminists have been particularly vocal about the burqa and like Sarkozy see it as a symbol of subservience. According to Silhem Habchi from the women’s rights group ‘Ni Putes, Ni Soumises’ (Neither Whores Nor Subjected), it is a symbol of fascism and “the Talibanisation of religion.” More than 50 MPs from across the political spectrum have called for restrictions on wearing burqa which they describe as a “coffin”.

Yet the actual number of burqa and niqaab (with eye-slit) wearers in France is low. Muslim groups estimate that there are perhaps only a few hundred women fully covering themselves out of a Muslim population of over 5 million. Ironically, many of those who fully cover are converts.

Underneath the language of laicite and paternalism bares a history that only partly explains the fetishistic approach on the part of the state to maintain a particular French identity that is secular, European and homogeneous.

France’s past attests to a long struggle between the state and church which culminated in French laicite (secularism)—the strict division between the state and church. The 1905 law of secularity is enforced militantly but relevant to the current context, the law was founded on a homogeneous France that no longer exists today.

Since the 1970s, France has been growing in cultural diversity with the presence of cheap labour workers from its former colonies in the Maghreb. However, French attitude toward cultural diversity would suggest little has changed in the demographic makeup of the country. The state does not recognise minority rights and enforces a colonial-style assimilation model on its immigrants whereby they’re expected to assimilate into a French abstraction. Thus, religious and cultural rights are only approved in consideration of a particular French secularism and mainly relegated to the private. In the case of Islam, this has been hugely problematic considering the private and public aren’t divided as such in matters of religious practice.  The hijab has become symbolic of this contention.

An interesting debate occurred on Al Jazeera between director of Human Rights Watch in Paris Jean-Marie Fardeau, writer Anne Elizabeth Moutet and Saudi media personality in the Middle East, Muna Abdulsulayman. I’m in agreement with Abdulsulayman that the burqa isn’t obligatory in Islam and shouldn’t be defended as such, but I think she should have really stressed the right for a woman to choose to wear it. I’ve blogged about the burqa in France here and here  in note of this, however, I pointed out in my post that I do believe that a woman’s right to choose how to express her religion (her interpretation of what modesty is) or her culture as she sees fit is fundamental to her dignity and should be protected. So, it is a matter of choice—whether we agree with it or not is irrelevant.

My other main objection to the proposed ban of the burqa is within the context of the 2004 legislation which prohibits the wearing of “ostentatious religious symbols” in public schools and government offices. Though it was claimed it was not specifically targeting any religious group, it mainly affected the wearing of headscarves for young Muslim women. Like they have been with the burqa issue, French feminists were equally as vocal and supported the ban. Well known French feminists like Anne Vigerie, the leader of a feminist think tank and Elisabeth Badinter reinforced the media’s theme of associating the hijab with Islamic extremism, viewing the headscarf as ‘le drapeu sur la tete” (flag on the head) that confirms the underdeveloped status of women in radical Islam.

The ban too was justified with the claim it was to ‘protect’ women from religious misogyny. In actuality, these debates are emphatically demonstrating the state’s attempt to eradicate the presence of Islam in public.

In its attempt to justify the violation of basic religious and cultural freedoms, France has vehemently responded to criticism explaining that it is  for the state’s security. From what exactly? A type of dress worn by a ridiculously small minority of women? It’s interesting to note that at the time of the 2004 ban, the number of women wearing it was small in proportion to the total Muslim population. But in both cases the hysteria that the headscarf and burqa has whipped up would suggest that it is worn by millions striving to dominate French society.

French philosopher Alain Badiou writes that it is fear that drives such criticism of ‘foreign’ (Muslim) dress. The justification for protecting a secular identity is a front to undermine Islam in France, and this is closely tied with another part of France’s history:  the French conquest of Algeria in 1830. The country suffers from a pathological fear of a ‘Muslim threat’ born in the Algerian revolutionary struggle against French colonialism. The hijab in its haik form was used as a form of national assertion and a reclaiming of a Muslim and cultural identity. Thus, the same French mission to civilise Muslim women persists today. French Muslim women are being ‘unveiled’ as part of a contemporary French colonial mission civilisatrice, in order to ‘teach’ the Muslim Other the superiority of Western knowledge and culture.

Today,  the presence of the hijab in whatever form is one that offends. This is because it’s a symbol of the failure to ‘civilise’ the Algerian and by extension, Muslims. The burqa’s presence awakens a French fear and humiliation of the ‘loss’ of Algeria and the historical defeat to Islam. It is also symbolic of the irreducible difference and thus the unassimilability of Islam. Europeans –in this case French– identity is conveniently constructed to contrast with the other (Muslim) who do not belong in Europe. 

These fears are accentuated further in the post 911 context in which Islam and Muslims have become victims of a bogeyman mindset which has had  major implications on Muslims:  They are the ‘enemy within’–dehumanised to the point of irrelevance.

So the current burqa issue can only be understood in its proper context which recognises Europe’s history with the Muslim world, France’s colonisation of the Maghreb and the current 911 political climate where Islamophobia has permeated all levels of European society.

Women as symbols in Iranian protests

Sahar

I’ve been carefully watching the events unfolding in Iran in the aftermath of the elections in which Mahmoud Ahmedinejad was declared President of Iran.  Of course the debate on whether the elections were rigged or not has dominated the narrative but what’s been interesting is Western mainstream media have taken a special interest in covering this election but with a clear bias.  Western media have categorically taken the side of defeated candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi. We have been exposed to dramatic coverage of chaos in Iranian streets and many have gone as far to say that we’re witnessing another 1979 revolution style uprising. Of course anyone who is familiar with Iran and is history would realize the protests we’re witnessing today are miniscule to that of the protests of the late 1970s which led to a democratic theocracy led by Ayatollah Khomeini.  I have my doubts about the supposed rigging of the elections and the unpopularity of Ahmedinejad but it’s been fascinating to watch how the story is being told to the world through the lens of new media like Twitter, You Tube and Facebook.

The most dominant images flooding out of Iran have been of young Iranian women.  They seem to be at the forefront of the resistance. Many of these women are in fashionable attire wearing the most high fashion labels, beautiful and wearing loose hijab. This latter point may sound minor but in a country like Iran, the politics of the hijab has had powerful consequences.  Covering and uncovering has been infused with political messages since the Pahlavi period—revolving around binary constructions of ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’. In his effort to ‘modernise’ Iran through European eyes, the Reza Shah banned the hijab in 1936; although the ban was uplifted, the hijab was perceived by the state and higher classes as a symbol of Iran’s backwardness, a hindrance for women’s rights and progress.

Almost hijabless yet oh so chic Mousavi supporter

Infusing the hijab with such political meaning has meant the very act of covering and uncovering is a political act. So it is not a surprise then that during the revolutionary period in which masses of Iranians protested against the Shah’s despotism, women of all classes donned the hijab (its black chador form) as an act of defiance against the monarchy and also in class solidarity. The visibility of the hijab has meant that both ‘modernisers’ and ‘religious orthodoxy’ have used it to validate their ideology. The current state’s endorsement of the black chador wearing women is considered by the current regime as the ‘ideal’ woman of the nation. Shahla Sherkat calls it the ‘official uniform’. According to Nima Naghibi resistance against the regime has continues through dress—whether it’s a different coloured hijab or revealing a fringe—the bad hijabi phenomenon.

The black chador wearing female supporter of Ahmedinejad.

The hijab’s history is coming to the fore as we witness the political consequences of women’s image. It is through women’s body where the politics of validation is played out.  Although it hasn’t been shown much in the media, there are young women on both sides of the political spectrum which interestingly show the ‘modern’ and ‘tradition’ dichotomy that’s always been a cause of contention in Iran– the chador-wearing Ahmedinejad supporter versus the Gucci wearing-dyed fringe-loose hijab wearing Mousavi supporter. Or so it seems.

The presence of Zahrad Rahvanard alongside her husband has greatly legitimized Mousavi’s position. She too is shown in a great deal in these images with her floral hijab, over a black layer—either a symbol of her compromising position or to show a sign of brightness –hope– underneath the blackness of the regime.

Coupled with such imagery, the video of Nega-Agha Soltan, a 26 year old Iranian woman who was killed in a street protest has become the symbol of Iranian women’s efforts to fight Islamic fundamentalism. Like the hijab, her death– captured in her bloody face that’s been disseminated around the world –has become the symbol of the regime’s misogyny and a justification for political dissent.

Mimi from Threadbared has written a brilliant analysis of the hijab in media coverage of the protests. She writes “the image of the Iranian woman in her loose headscarf is not a straightforward arrow from Islamic backwardness to liberal progress, but a nuanced and multi-dimensional map of political discourse and struggle”. Indeed, on the one hand it certainly will be interpreted as a yearning for liberal democracy by Westerners but as I argued in my thesis, the hijab’s meaning and power has been contingent upon political events in Iran and consequently has multiple dimensions and points of debate.

I also can’t help think that the overwhelming images of women in fashion attire, makeup and loose hijab has another dangerous implication: the wonderful potentials of opening Iran up further to consumer capitalist markets. The hijab, specifically the chador, is a hindrance to the exploitation of women’s bodies. Whereas, a loosening of the regime could mean unveiling the Iranian woman (and thus Iran) in which she becomes a more participatory member of global consumer culture.  Her body will become more accessible and susceptible to consumer trends—a return to the Shah’s Falangi dolls. Of course this process is guised under the rubric of emancipation.

Whatever the results of these protests, it is becoming abundantly clear that the strong presence of women on both sides alongside men on the streets and other political campaigning is indicative of the historical mobilisation of women (during the revolution and the Iran-Iraq war 1980-88)) and the significance of the ‘woman question’ is one that cannot be ignored.  Women’s active political participation is fiercely undermining the reductive perceptions many have of Iranian women who are often depicted as victims of Islamic theocracy and silenced by their hijab.  They are therefore complicating the Iranian woman and showing that her position is constantly shifting and being contested.

It’s Barbie’s World.

Farah

Turns out Melbourne will soon be host to ‘Forever Barbie’ – an exhibition which “celebrates 50 years of a pop culture icon.” I’ve had my fair share of Barbie dolls when I was younger but an exhibition? Since when did Barbie become an appropriate ‘cultural’ artefact to celebrate?

The critiques against Barbie are well known; she is a commodification of the “feminine” and symbolises and perpetuates (white) standards of beauty. Barbie constructs a certain reality of femininity, one in which her consumers by extension participate. Barbie exists to consume. She pairs endless consumption with the attainment of a particular beauty standard. Capitalist tools don’t get better than her. You can read more in “Barbie Culture” by Mary Frances Rogers.

Later, it was decided to give Barbie some ethnic friends. Through these later dolls Mattel reinforced the white standard of beauty by reduce cultural difference to costume changes and different colours of plastic. One of the highlights is “Princess Moroccan Barbie” and another Barbie Mattel created (which I can’t find a picture of) called “Leyla” who apparently was made to be a 1720’s Turkish Muslim slave girl.

Princess Morrocan Barbie

These dolls demonstrate how a certain type of the Other is created and promoted through the white, female body of plastic Barbie. Thanks Mattel. I feel sufficiently included within your capitalist gaze.

Now, we have Fulla who is marketed as a Muslim doll. She represents a ‘culturally sensitive alternative to Barbie’s flashy lifestyle.’ She isn’t made by Mattel but by a Syrian based company (called NewBoy) though she does have physical similarities to her white American counterpart (11” tall, can’t stand up, and both are made in the same factories in China). Fulla has “outdoor” and “indoor” clothes; her outdoor clothes include a hijab, a black abaya, or a long, cream coat.

Fulla

Her indoor clothes includes trendy, Western-style outfits. She also comes with a mini pink prayer mat. Fulla herself has long black hair, large brown eyes, painted on eyebrows, and an olive-like complexion (some of the images I’ve seen on the internet range from dark to as white as Barbie). She also has two ‘friends’; blonde-haired Yasmine and red-haired Nada. The
story was picked up in the media.

In her article “Islamic Barbie: The Politics of Gender and Performativity” Amina Yaqin discusses Razanne, a Muslim doll (again similar to Barbie) made by a Muslim couple in the US and sold through their website. Razanne is different to Fulla in that she doesn’t have ‘friends’ but you can get her in different ‘ethnicities’ – Fair Skin/Fair Hair, Olive Skin/Dark Hair or Dark Skin/Dark Hair. Like Fulla, Razanne has “inside” and “outside” fashion. At home, Razanne dresses in all the latest fashion, and when she wants to go out she wears her hijab and jilbaab. Yaqin argues that dolls like Razanne and Fulla to a certain extent present an alternative conception of Muslim identity because the dolls are presented as a substitute to the culture of commodification. However, she concludes that it arguable whether the dolls break stereotyped representation of Muslim women, or whether the dolls reinforce stereotypes through the universalizing of a female Muslim subject. She rightly argues Razanna is a ‘veiled mimicry’ of Barbie.

So do Fulla and Razanne represent “protest products” made to resist Western consumer culture? Or, as Katie Cercone argues, are Fulla and Razanna (like their white Barbie counterparts) “emblem[s] of the cultural pressure to conform to one extremely limiting female role?” Renée Terrebonne takes up this point in her article “Fulla, the veiled Barbie: An analysis of cultural imperialism and agency”. Like Yaqin she argues that Fulla is a capitalist cultural artifact through her existence as a mime of Barbie. But she also argues that Fulla is “Barbie done differently to fit the needs of a group of people.” The consumer takes the globalised artifact (Barbie) and makes it local (Fulla). The capitalist icon is transformed, and is a complicated mimesis. It’s a positive step for Barbie and Barbie-like dolls everywhere.

I’ve always been a bit skeptical about the ‘glocalisation’ argument. McDonalds usually trots it out to make the claim that they “respect” other cultures by offering halal Big Macs. In this case I think it is important to realise while dolls like Fulla and Razanne do offer an alternative to Barbie, the doll is still inherently consumerist and constructs its own discourse of femininity. For example, take Razanne. While she is offered in different colours to ‘represent’ different ethnicities, the different dolls have exactly the same features, but are just slightly different colours. Fulla is created in the same factory in China as Barbie, and looks nearly exactly like Barbie just with slightly larger eyes and a slightly darker complexion. And none of them can actually stand up properly!

To a large extent Islam is being commodified to sell the doll. Fulla has started off a craze in the Middle East; you can get Fulla chewing gum, bags and bicycles, matching clothes, and a matching pink prayer rug for her young owner. A comment by a toy-store owner in Syria

Fulla CD player plus sing-a-long karaoke set

(quoted in a New York Times article got my attention. “”If you’ve got a TV in the house, it’s Fulla all the time,” she said.”The parents complain about the expense. But Fulla gives girls a more Islamic character to emulate, and parents want that.”

So capitalism’s ok as long as it teaches the kiddies? Forgive me if I want something other than a doll to teach my (potential) daughter my religious and cultural values.

This is a commercial for Fulla. It’s in Arabic, but watch it and try to spot all the Fulla merchandise: she’s praying on her signature pink rug, when on the phone to her friend she waves about a Fulla photo album, she uses Fulla cake mix to bake her friend a (Fulla brand) cake which is then decorated in her signature jasmine flower motif, she uses Fulla plates, she sleeps in Fulla bed sheets. In the end, glocalisation isn’t about finding the ‘agency’ of consumers in globalisation – it’s about Barbie done differently to sell more stuff.

One writer at the Guardian probably sums it up, “For parents it will be the same story regardless: an empty wallet and a houseful of small plastic people with fixed smiles and moulded matching accessories.”

Islamic Idol? What the…..??

Sahar

I thought I’d seen it all until I came across a news article on a show called Islamic Idol. I cringed. What next? Muslim Survivor? (probably already happened and I fortunately missed it).  It was bad enough hearing about ‘Afghan Star’ –a pop talent show in Afghanistan. While the country and its people,  ravaged by war and poverty, struggled to survive and make ends meet, the desperately needed dollars for development in Afghanistan were spent seeking untapped talent, as well as untapped resources. Capitalism is thriving in Afghanistan today, when not much else is.

As for Islamic Idol, there are so many problems with this I don’t know where to begin. The show is the creation of Egyptian Ahmed Abu-Heiba who wishes to use the “universal language” of music to spread the values of Islam.  He believes that Islam can also be ‘modern’ and needs to relate to young Muslims.  Apparently, to be modern is to emulate American consumer culture and mould one-self to fit into this ideal. It is not enough for the Arab world to be home to monstrous symbols of cultural imperialism whether in the guise of Mc Donald’s or fashion malls—the music world must too partake in the cultural mimetic festivities.

Capitalising on the trend of American idol, Islamic Idol replaced the original name 4shbab – Arabic for “For the Youth”. The Arab/Muslim world’s own god-like idol was to emerge.  It means little that idol worship is the very antithesis to Islam and its teachings; that Islam’s Prophet, Muhammad (pbuh) was sent to end idol worship.  Uncannily, the revivalism of idol-worship is profitable, like it once was for the Quraysh.

There’s more to it than profit though. Shows like American idol are a symptom of a secular society ravaged by capitalist exploitation needing spiritual fulfilment through the adoration of a figure that becomes, in theological terms, a visible symbol to believe in and draw inspiration from. Observing the American Idol experience, one can notice a religious-esque adoration of the contestants by the millions who vehemently rally in support and the meaning that it brings to their lives. The end result– a god-like idol basking in the glory of success and adoration of millions of hysterical fans.

The strong anti-idol current throughout Islam’s history seems irrelevant to the Arab media network who are keen to capitalise on an untapped audience: religious young Muslims, who apparently need meaning in their lives.   According to Abu-Heiba, there are few “Islamic singers”,

“I don’t have singers, the field is empty,” he said. “So I need a star-making process from the beginning to get my own stars to deliver my own message by my own way”

Is it really Abu-Heiba’s own way or is it the American way? Money can be made from anything in today’s day and age; it’s just a matter of observing trends and riding them. Islam becomes a commodity, repackaged to suit the market, and its teachings are reduced to a trend– to the popularity of a song or an individual. What happens to the teachings espoused by a one-hit wonder? Do they also go out the window and replaced by new ones?  Such are the dangers in commoditizing religious values.

What does Islam look like for Islamic Idol? Apparently, it’s in the guise of rock and hip-hop and only the face of men singing about Islamic values. The young men on the show sing about “leading a virtuous life, going to mosque and supporting their families, from helping their sisters with homework to taking out the garbage”.

However, the channel shows no female singers – or any other women. The justification for this being the mainstream view of women performers are taboo in Islam. I don’t recall there being male performers in Islam, wearing stupid makeup, medallions, and open shirts– mimicking a consumer culture bowing to materialism. It is also problematic that a show, whether I agree with it or not, claims to be addressing the needs of religious youth yet ignores half if not more of its youth population. How are young women represented? Who is telling their story and experiences? Why it’s the clever insight of men who are, we’re told.

I guess Muslim women would have to be represented by the secular pop-music channels which shamelessly show scantily clad women, whose only talent seems to be offering themselves as sex symbols.