The Permission to Narrate
September 19, 2009
Sahar
Feminists Naomi Wolf and Philis Chesler have recently been debating the topic of the ‘veil’ and Muslim women. It’s become somewhat of a heated debate with both sides claiming they have a better insight into the lives of Muslim women. This audacious insight of course does not actually rely on actual engagement with Muslim women, nor the participation of Muslim women in this debate– aside from brief references that are then interpreted and made to make sense through the position of both women.
Just a brief overview of the debate first: Wolf’s experience in Morocco led her to make the following claim that Muslim women are not necessarily restricted by their religious attire (chador and headscarf) and in fact feel liberated, especially sexually. From these observations, Wolf calls for a more nuanced approach in understanding women’s freedom. Chesler has responded with the charge that Wolf is legitimizing oppressive practices and responds with outrageous statements that conclude with the following: Muslim women are oppressed in Islamic attire, they lack agency, and the Western approach to liberation is more fitting.
What interested me was the assumption of these women to debate the issue of the hijab (whatever forms of it) and the experiences of Muslim women without involving a practicing Muslim woman who observes the hijab or at least be a part of the community and faith that practices it, and thus be more qualified on the subject.
Wolf attempts to recognise the opinions of Moroccan women and speaks on their experiences, but her own understanding of Islam, Muslim women or even the subject of Muslim dress seems to be too difficult for her when she confuses Pakistani dress (‘shalwar kameez’) with Moroccan Islamic dress which can come in the form of niqaab, abaya, jilbaba or just modestly dressed in loose pants/skirt/top and a headscarf. So Wolf not only ignores the differences in cultural dress—for the Muslim world is just one monolithic entity anyway– these differences don’t really exist and can all fall under the category of ‘traditional dress’ conveniently juxtaposed against Western ‘modern dress’. By wearing any traditional Muslim dress (‘shalwar kazmeez’), Wolf thinks she has direct access to the experiences of Muslim women. Dress therefore becomes the embodiment of Muslim women’s lives, and a way to access their world.
As for Chesler, she too does not have much credibility (not that she does in the first place considering her inane islamophobic and racist views on Palestinians and Muslims as a whole) when she declares that ‘most’ Muslim girls and women are not given a choice in wearing any Islamic dress. She supports her claims by shamelessly citing two women (Hirsi Ali and Nouri Darwish) who have publicly renounced Islam and have built their careers on feeding Islamophobic hysteria in the West. So Muslim women are spoken for either through an Islamophobic feminist or apostates who work for right-wing American think tanks bent on demonizing Muslims and Islam.
Putting these absurdities aside, I also find it telling how the debate treats Muslim women as objects in an exhibition, as spectacles, who function as objects to be analysed, observed, dissected, commented and repackaged to be easily consumed by a Western audience. Muslim women’s voices are only heard through interpretation of two white women (the subject) who assume the permission to narrate what it is like to be a Muslim woman who chooses to cover her head, in whatever form.
The alienness of Muslim culture is retold in the language of universalism (western norms and feminist ideals) to ease the anxiety of the Western observer towards difference. We see this in how Wolf insists that there are similar sentiments behind Islamic dress that Western feminists can relate to “This may not be expressed in a traditional Western feminist set of images, but it is a recognisably Western feminist set of feelings”. Or in the intimacy of Muslim homes, the presence of designer labels like Victoria Secret is comforting. Muslim mores are measured against white Western standards and only legitimised and accepted once shared values and practices are recognised. To send the reassuring message: “see, they are just like ‘us’”.
The notion of white being a signifier of objectivity is imperative here. Wolf, like the colonial traveler, is an objective observer who can participate in the local customs and wear the traditional dress– yet can remain ‘detached’ from her surrounding in order to make perceptive observations that can be taken away for examination. Thus, both women’s subjectivities as white, upper-middle class Western women are not called into question when they speak on behalf of Muslim women in this debate. It is in fact this same subjectivity that permits them to narrate for Muslim women. They speak with an unquestionable authority as whiteness has a moral-worth of its own masquerading as universal and never questioned.
So it is not that Muslim women are silenced by her hijab, as many white feminists like to claim, but because they are made to be silent by those who wish to speak for them.
An Unwanted Spokeswoman
August 26, 2009
Sahar
I couldn’t help but laugh out loud when I read Mark Landler of The New York Times’ interview with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Reminiscent of a colonial-style arrogance, the brazen title of the interview, ‘Saving the World’s Woman—A New Gender Agenda’ set the mood of the interview.
In the interview, Clinton is asked a series of questions in which she highlights political, economic and social problems facing women today, and what she considers ‘solutions’. We are given the impression that she wants to be remembered for her contribution in alleviating the problems women are facing.
I find it remarkable that Clinton– who assumes the role of spokeswoman for all women in the world—is talking about global women’s rights, while concurrently a part of a government that has wrought so much havoc on many in the developing countries specifically mentioned in the interview (India, Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq).
I wasn’t surprised by her attempt to present herself as a representative of women, considering she ran in the Presidential elections under such a rubric. However, her policy stance on women seems disjointed and incongruous when you consider she is known for her hawkish stance on numerous issues like nuclear weapons and Iran, national security and the Israel-Palestine conflict. According to academic Stephen Zunes, she has opposed restrictions on U.S. arms transfers and police training to governments that have horrendous human rights violations like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Israel. She has insisted upon unconditional funding for the disastrous and illegal war in Iraq and further increase in military spending.
Clinton asserts “ I happen to believe that the transformation of women’s roles is the last great impediment to universal progress — that we have made progress on many other aspects of human nature that used to be discriminatory bars to people’s full participation. But in too many places and too many ways, the oppression of women stands as a stark reminder of how difficult it is to realize people’s full human potential”.
Putting aside the contention of a normative discourse on universal human rights, theoretically, Clinton, like any Western leader, adheres to this liberal notion and stresses the importance of universal human rights, yet, she has questioned the credibility of known human rights organisations like Amnesty International when they’ve criticised the policies of the U.S. and its allies. Moreover, she has also been an outspoken critic of the UN, opting for a unilateral stance in international politics.
She further states “Women and girls are a core factor in our foreign policy”—yet her historical record suggests either she is being disingenuous or is oblivious to the implications of her policies on women in particular.
Knowing the implications of war with Iran because of the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, she has eagerly continued with a hawkish stance on confronting Iran where in which she has described the Iranian ‘threat’ as unacceptable and suggesting a military strategy is possible. Early this year she vehemently defended the abhorrent Israeli invasion of Gaza which killed over 1000 civilians. Just this month she has finalised a defense agreement with India to ensure US companies sell sophisticated arms to New Delhi. Clinton states that she travels and talks about women’s rights and raises women’s concerns with leaders while simultaneously ensuring the imperial praxis remains. It’s difficult to imagine how women’s lives are improved when she encourages and in fact openly endorses increasing militarism in countries like Pakistan, India, Iraq, Israel and Afghanistan—rather than on development to ensure political, economic and social stability. There is no mention of the structural mechanisms in place which generate North-South inequalities and maintain them via neo-liberal policies. These global economic policies create an unsafe environment for women and children who are vulnerable to war and poverty. Clinton would much rather blame women’s oppression on religious fundamentalism and global terrorism.
“If you look at where we are fighting terrorism, there is a connection to groups that are making a stand against modernity, and that is most evident in their treatment of women”. What Clinton fails to understand, or purposely ignores is that the Islamic movements she is alluding to are modernist movements which are resisting U.S. foreign policies in the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia. They are not simply resisting because of their hate of freedom, so the Bush administration mantra went—rather, they are modern in their own right and challenging a Western hegemony and a colonial modernity that is being imposed on them in the guise of economic exploitation and Western consumer culture.
With glaring audacity she continues,
“What does preventing little girls from going to school in Afghanistan by throwing acid on them have to do with waging a struggle against oppression externally?”
Clearly it’s in Clinton’s best interest as a representative of a government responsible for so many of the conflicts raging in many Muslim countries, to ignore the historical and political context in which women’s issues can be better understood. The cultural violence that has ensued by Western countries in the ‘developing’ world harks back to colonialism and perpetuated today in similar policies of exploitation and domination. The throwing of acid can only be understood within such a context in order to read it accurately as a response to the encroachment on national sovereignty and the cultural life of these people—where women often are seen as the cultural/national symbol. Thus, instability ensures women become a prime target of preserving what is perceived to be cultural losses.
If Clinton was genuine about wanting to help women (which I certainly doubt she is) she should– along with her ‘white sisters’– stop basking in the colonial glory of ‘saving’ women in developing countries. Instead, she should acknowledge her complicity in ensuring that current oppressive political and economic structures remain, which reinforces a dichotomy of power and powerless that has had disastrous effects on global politics, particularly on the lives of women. But I wouldn’t hold my breath on that one.
Farah
One of the commenters on my burka ban post a couple of weeks ago led me to the story of Lubna Ahmed al-Hussein – a Sudanese journalist who was arrested along with 11 other women in a Khartoum café for breaking Sudanese indecency laws by wearing trousers. While 10 of her companions have pleaded guilty to the offence, al-Hussein has decided to challenge the law. She has come out quite strongly against the indecency laws, and has declared that she is willing to take her case to the highest court in Sudan and, if they do not rule in her favour, she is willing to be lashed “not 40, but 40,000 times”.
She was quoted in the Guardian as saying, “Islam does not say whether a woman can wear trousers or not … It is not about religion, it is about men treating women badly.” Similarly, in her article “Lubna, a case of subduing a woman’s body” published in Al-Horreya newspaper shortly after al-Hussein’s arrest Sudanese journalist Amal Habbani also highlights that this law and the treatment of al-Hussein was “not about fashion but a political tactic to intimidate and terrorize opponents.” Habbani has since been charged and fined by the government after the article was published.
Sudan has a long history of women’s activism, and the strong support Sudanese women and men have given Al-Hussein has been highlighted over the past weeks. This activism stretches back to the 1989 coup that put the NIF in power. In “Gender Politics and Islamization in Sudan” Sondra Hale highlights that women were at the forefront of the 1989 coup. She notes that women were far more than “the ‘Greek chorus’ of the Islamic revolution. They [were] the central organizers and socializers … these women were not only learning and interpreting Islam for themselves and other women, but were also militant, independent in spirit, and effective organizers in the movement.” Leaders like Hasan al-Turabi came out in strong support of the role of women in the new Sudan, including in his pamphlet “On the Position of Women in Islam and in Islamic Society” published in 1973. But Hale questions whether or not women can sustain such an activist role now that the NIF is consolidating their control. Take for example the indecency laws. They are a part of a broader campaign in which women are re-socialized and religious ideas and institutions manipulated to form new power relationships. But the campaign verges on essentializing Islam; women’s behavior in the name of the ‘ideal woman’ is being ideologically manipulated by male-controlled religio-political institutions.
Lubna Ahmed al-Hussein. Image via Sudan Tribune
• “al-Hussein wears the pants”
• “Lubna Hussein, standing up to Sudanese law on who wears the pants”
and other predictable variations on “Guess who wear’s the pants”, “blah blah pants wearing”. Alternatively, there was
• “Fashion statement: A Sudanese woman risks a flogging over pants” (fashion statement? Really?)
• “Lubna Hussein makes an ass of the law”
• “Trouser martyr”
• “Martyr to her trousers”
which is probably a bit much – she’s not dead so can we lay off the martyr talk?
Discussions of appropriate clothing are certainly not restricted to Muslim women. In 2006 Australian judge Peter Young said that some ‘well built’ female lawyers wore inappropriately revealing clothing. In an opinion piece, he stated “It is clear that some female solicitors have no idea of appropriate court dress. The worst offenders are usually well-built women who expose at least the upper halves of their breasts, and as they lean forward to make a point to a judge sitting at a high level they present a most unwelcome display of bare flesh.” The opinion of a respected member of society in a country where supposedly ‘democratic’ values prevail – and that was only a couple of years ago. More recently (and when I say recent I mean yesterday) German Chancellor Angela Merkel and politician Vera Lengsfeld (both members of the conservative party) have come under fire for publishing an election ad campaign where both wore low-cut dresses which showed ample amounts of cleavage – apparently the ad lowered the tone of the election and was ‘inappropriate’.
While Merkel, Lengsfeld and all those well-built female lawyers aren’t breaking laws, people’s attitudes remain the same. I’m not downplaying the significance of al-Hussein’s situation; there is a concern she could be flogged and I don’t agree with laws that prosecute against ‘indecent’ clothing, whether that clothing is trousers or burqas. But the issue here is a lot bigger than just a right to wear pants and focussing on that right alone obscures the broader issue. In a second article called “Alienation and Belonging—Women’s Citizenship and Emanciation: Visions for Sudan’s Post-Islamist Future”, Hale notes that “one of the unanswered questions … is why women are … superficially on the agenda … and, yet, a vision for what a gender egalitarian society would look like is glossed over or ignored.” The right of a woman to control her own body emerges in a number of contexts in all countries in a number of areas, including right to wear clothing free from legal constraints. These issues relate to broader questions about the role of women. What is deemed appropriate/inappropriate in certain contexts? Do we have a right to dictate by law the choices women make? And what type of national identity is being dictated to women, and being constructed over our bodies?
While we wait for an answer to those questions, I want to start a campaign. Not about al-Hussein – she already has ample support both in Sudan and across the world (Sarkozy has even jumped on the bandwagon). My campaign? Free Merkel and Lengsfeld’s cleavage from our traditional and backward attitudes. Do you want a society in which your daughter can’t show off her cleavage (if she has any, and if she doesn’t she can always get implants – not that I’m suggesting your daughter conform to a particular standard of beauty)? Come on people, do it for the kids.
Burqas, Bans and Feeble Women
July 27, 2009
Farah
I was a bit reluctant to add my voice to the “Do we ban the burqa?” debate considering the excellent stuff that’s been written, including Sahar’s response and Shakira Hussein’s post at new site South Asian Masala. I’m also aware of the dangers of endless debate on the burqa – Islam and Muslims are lot more diverse than a single item of clothing. But the debate took on a distinct Australian tone when a number of Australian journalists voiced their opinions. Jill Singer (journalist at Herald Sun) put in her 2 cents – falling in favour of a ban. She writes that the burqa is “all such a load of male supremacist tosh… the burka sends all sorts of messages that are anathema to ideals of freedom and gender equality.” I then found this op-ed by Australian journalist Virginia Haussegger “Ban the unAustralian burka” she writes. The Australian National University then hosted a public debate featuring Haussegger, Julie Posetti, and Shakira Hussein – the latter two arguing against a ban.
A lot of writers (including Posetti and Hussein) against a ban point out that a number of women actively choose to wear the burqa or niqab. While the burqa has been used by groups to subjugate women, these writers highlight the need to identify the agency of these Muslim women, rather than denying them that agency which a ban would do. But Haussegger quickly dismisses this argument. She writes:
“I abhor the burka, and the niqab. I hate what it does to women … I am furious that some women will continue to choose to wear it. But then, throughout history, feeble women who are afraid of modernity, have always been complicit in their own oppression.”
Feeble women complicit in their own oppression? Gee Haussegger the respect you have for your fellow women really shines through your writing. She disregards the experience of the individual woman wearing the burqa; it is less important than what the burqa symbolises. She continues:
“The burka … and the niqab … [are] … tool[s] of patriarchy used to subjugate women. This shroud of cloth thrown over women defies freedom. It is a symbol of control. Wearing it signifies an acceptance of segregation of the sexes.”
My problem is that her argument it’s too simplistic; burqa = subjection and oppression, no burqa = freedom. And I don’t remember when stark dichotomies that replicated Orientalist assumptions actually helped anyone. When analysing a burqa it’s important to keep in mind that it’s a powerful, loaded symbol and operates within a broader discourse. In Mythologies Roland Barthes’s suggested that signs could be used as signifiers for other concepts; those concepts he identified as mythologies formed to perpetuate an idea of society. The myths are artificial constructions, adding a new layer of meaning over text and speech. He highlights that what we accept as being a natural, inductive relationship between the text and the myth is in fact an illusory reality constructed in order to mask the real structure of power.
In her approach Haussegger uses the burka as a loaded symbolic text for an idea – the oppression and subjugation of women. And like Barthes notes, to symbolize is to be. So, even if a garment does not literally restrict, if it signifies restriction then the garment restricts all those who wear it, freely chosen or not. But the myth of oppression constructed around the burqa deprives the burqa of substance; the burqa is distorted to suit the needs of the myth. Though it remains within the concept, it is “half-amputated … deprived of memory … [it is] speech wholly at the service of the concept. The concept, literally, deforms, but does not abolish the meaning … it alienates it.”
Another important point to acknowledge is that Haussegger assumes that all those oppressed Muslim will tear of their burqa’s and proclaim liberation were a ban in place. Unfortunately not many pro-ban writers acknowledge that forced removal of a vital part of a woman’s identity will see those women further retreat from the public into the home. We are all too aware of the “women need to be liberated” rhetoric adopted by the Bush regime in order to justify the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Well the Taliban are gone and the Afghan women are liberated – they no longer need to wear their burqas! And yet, Taliban or not the situation of women has barely improved – the majority of women (including Malalai Joya whom Hausseggar loves to cite as supporting her argument) continue to wear the burqa for security reasons. Similarly, at crikey Durkhanai Ayubi writes, “If a ban on the “unAustralian” burqah were to be accepted, women who choose to wear one will be further alienated from society.” It also reminds me of a post Faith wrote over at MMW regarding a Dutch anti-discrimination ad campaign. And as Hussein points out in the ANU public debate, you can’t force liberation onto women.
I’m not denying the use of the burqa to oppress and subjugate women. But to then deny that the burqa inhabits a number of uses and roles along with oppression is to deny the inherent dynamism of the burqa. Linking it to one myth and generalising that experience to the whole of Muslim women is patronising and smacks of neo-colonialism. As Nazish Brohi argues in her article “At the Altar of Subalternity: The Quest for Muslim Women in the War on Terror Pakistan after 9/11″, “this selective invocation is reducing spaces for women’s personal identity formation and its political articulation, and by coopting the very language of women’s rights and empowerment and investing in it political strategies, has rendered it ineffective.” And the lingering question remains: banning a garment, a single piece of clothing, doesn’t necessarily combat the ideology that is used when the burqa is forced onto women. A ban would be an empty, symbolic gesture perpetuating another myth and another power structure: Australia’s control over the Others in our midst, dictating that “we” know about democracy, Australian-ness and compassion while “they” do not.
During the debate Haussegger referred to French minister Fadela Amara and her organisation Ni putes ni soumises, “Neither Whores Nor Submissives”, arguing that Amara is a Muslim feminist who also supports the ban on the burqa. In a second post written after the public debate Haussegger also highlights Mona Eltahawy’s anti-burqa stance published at the New York Times. Sahar’s already responded to Eltahawy a couple of weeks ago, and it’s enough to note here that Amara’s organisation and her views have come under fire for supporting a racist, essentialised construction of women and Islam. What I wanted to highlight is the way in which Haussegger is using Amara and Eltahawy opinions as native informers. In her article “Should I Go and Pull Her Burqa Off? Feminist Compulsions, Insider Consent, and a Return to Kandahar” Usamah Ansari analyses the role of the native informer within the context of the documentary “Return to Kandahar”. She argues that women like Eltahawy and Amara are “Orientalized insider subject[s] who mediate the audience’s encounter with the Other… [they are] positioned within a supposedly traditional society and yet also exposed enough to modernity to speak to the audience.” Their voices are legitimised by Haussegger more so than Rabiah Hutchinson, an Australian Muslim convert who freely choses to wear the burqa but whose choice is dismissed by Haussegger because “not all choices are good choices.” Haussegger also states that Hutchinson has also made several bad choices in the past, so we can’t really rely on her as providing an alternative approach to the burqa. The inherent danger with relying on the views of Eltahawy and Amara is that it obscures the multitude of Muslim women who speak out in favour of a more dynamic construct of the burqa. Instead of relying on Eltahawy and Amara’s voices as being an ‘authentic’ view of how things should change ‘over there’, we must interrogate how their views relate to and contribute to the reductive approach to Islam and women’s experiences. And as Ansari concludes, “this interrogation helps challenge the essentialist notion that, by virtue of her insider status [their] testimony ‘‘rightly’’ provides a picture of how [the] community should be. Thus, by questioning the authentic insider we challenge the very foundations of consents to imperialism.”
The last op-ed I’d like to point you to is one by Australia’s biggest neo-con journalist – Andrew Bolt. I stopped reading the pseudo-journalism he churns out a long time ago but I find myself in the uneasy position of for once not thinking he’s a complete tosser. In his op-ed he notes, “I’d say I agreed the burqa was offensive, oppressive and divisive. I’d be very glad if it were removed from Australia, but I’d rather wage that battle with opinions than bans.” Andrew Bold not arguing in favour of a ban?? Admittedly, there are still shades of idiocy but for once he’s not acting like a COMPLETE tool. Maybe Haussegger (and the rest of the pro-ban writers) should take note of two things, firstly, read up on how to deconstruct semiological systems which perpetuate the creation of modern myths (rather than contribute to such systems) and secondly, if ANDREW BOLT doesn’t argue for a ban then maybe a ban is a lost cause.
A feminist blog?
July 25, 2009
Sahar
A lot of people describe Nuseiba as a feminist blog because it focuses on Muslim women and attempts to express their voice on multiple issues. However, I don’t really like the idea of Nuseiba being understood as a feminist blog, because my intentions for it are part of a broader project of Islamic revivalism. So I was pleased to come across the writings and work of Nadia Yassine, who is the founder and head of the woman’s branch of the Moroccan Islamist movement Al Adl Wa Al Ihsanne (Justice and Charity). Yassine highlights her position as a politically active Muslim woman who is conscious of the issues plaguing her community, especially that of women. Her vision, expressed in the following quote, is similar to what I see for Nuseiba.
If you mean by feminism pleading the cause of women, then I am a feminist; but better yet, I’m activist for the restoring of the rights granted to women by Islam. But I am very cautious regarding labels. Mine is not the feminism of Simone de Beauvoir, the Western style feminism. I have my very own Islamic references.
The thing is the West got rid of the idea of God, at least in the public sphere. Its endeavors are purely materialistic. They thus automatically exclude any idea of spirituality or return to God. My struggle, on the other hand, is essentially spiritual, not a struggle between men and women for material entitlements. God has given rights to women in Islam; these inalienable rights are far greater than any rights enjoyed by other women anywhere else at any given time. With that said, the rights of women in Islam have unfortunately eroded over the course of Islamic history. This malaise that has steadily eroded the rights of women in Islam has taken its toll on men too. It is an endeavor to restore the rightful place of women in a society that can never be revived without their real participation.
Europe, Islamophobia and Lone Wolves
July 16, 2009
Farah
Marwa al-Sherbini was a 31-year old Egyptian wife, mother, daughter and sister. She was stabbed in court by a German man identified as Axel W. They were in court at Alex W’s appeal against a fine for insulting her in 2008. He called her a terrorist and Islamist while she was playing with her three-year-old son in a park. The prosecutor of Alex W’s impending murder charge, Christian Avenarius, said: “It was very clearly a xenophobic attack of a fanatical lone wolf.” But as Sobia over at MMW points out in her response, “[Alex W’s] hate of Muslims and derogatory views of Muslims were not his own creation, but rather a creation of the world he lives in. His actions were not that of a lone wolf, but rather of one living in a society full of Islamophobia.”
While running the risk of my voice drowning in a sea of other blog posts, an interesting discussion has developed in response to Sobia’s post. Is the “lone wolf argument” valid, or is his attack symptomatic of a wider, deeper racist Islam and Muslims gripping Europe and America? More importantly, is it valid to analyse Alex W’s actions within a broader context (systematic Islamophobia) while denying context to violence that occurs within Muslim communities and/or by Muslims?
Nesrine Malik at the Guardian also asks the same question. “Muslims … constantly protest that the actions of a few extremists should not be allowed to denigrate Islam and its adherents as a whole – but this is exactly what they are doing themselves in connection with Europeans and the actions of Axel W.” The problem I have with this argument is that it’s simplistic. Manifestations of racism within Europe and America must be understood within a history of institutionalised racism not only against Muslims but other minority groups like gypsies and slaves. You can’t then flip the position and argue to understand extremism in the same way. Attributing acts of violence committed by Muslims to a broader context of “Islam” to me suggests that such acts are justified by Islam. It also ignores other potent issues which must also be looked at when analysing such acts. The other problem I have is that when acts of extremism or domestic violence occur by Muslims or within Muslim communities, the default reaction everyone has is to firstly, blame the whole of Islam and then secondly ask every Muslim to explain what happened. Every single time! It’s like a never ending car trip, you know, “are we there yet are we there yet?”
Take Aasiya Hassan’s murder. Some of the first headlines that started emerging involved some form of the words honour killing, Islam and wife-bashing Muslim husband, and included with immediate comparisons to the usual three countries (Afghanistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia) and the oppression of women there. Never mind the fact that there was a history of domestic violence in the marriage or that both weren’t actually from Afghanistan, Iran OR Saudi Arabia. And don’t even mention the fact that both actually grew up in the US, because that would suggest that something other than Islam (say, something like diaspora or alienation in a foreign land) actually contributed to the husband’s mental instability ( but note I say “contribute” not “justify”.) This isn’t to undermine the oppression of women in those countries, but the misogyny in say Saudi Arabia isn’t really comparable to case of domestic violence in the USA – different analyses are required.*
So racism in Europe and America must be understood within a historical context. The ideological justification for racism has been maintained for centuries. The Enlightenment provided the colonial powers with an explicitly racist justification for the colonial project. The period allowed the colonial powers to justify the dehumanization of colonial subjects. And that they did extremely well. Racism today might not be so strictly ‘race-based’ anymore, but like John Solomos and Les Beck point out race today is “coded as culture.” This is the new racism – defined by George Fredrickson as “a way of thinking about difference that reifies and essentializes culture rather than genetic endowment, or in other words, makes culture do the work of race.” The institutionalized structures of racist ideology remain operative, but they now stigmatize cultural or religious groups as dangerous and foreign. And the fact remains: hostility and discrimination against Muslims “represent a reversion to the way that the differences between ethnoracial groups could be made to seem indelible and unbridgeable.”
While writing this post, I found this article courtesy of the BBC. Neo-Nazi convicted of terror plan?? The poor misunderstood neo-Nazis! Seriously though guys, we should consider his acts to be of a lone-wolf style, his opinions not attributable to other neo-Nazis, and not an extension of Nazism in the 1930s. Otherwise, we could erroneously blame the neo-Nazi community and contribute to a culture of fear and hate towards … neo-Nazis… wait, what’s my argument again? I think I’m confused.
Yes, all violence must be understood contextually. So too must the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment and Islamophobia around Europe and America be understood. But that context is born out of the Enlightenment, has a history of colonialism and the subjugation and domination over the subaltern Other.
*The idea of a ‘global sisterhood’ of women and the so-called ‘universal’ female experience won’t be discussed here, mostly because I think such claims are a load of bull used to justify the ability of Western feminists to talk about issues affecting subaltern women in a way totally divorced from any real context.
The ‘enemy’ within: Muslims in France
July 4, 2009
Sahar
It seems France hasn’t had sufficient amount of negative attention. News has been buzzing on the latest debate over dress in the country. French President Nicolas Sarkozy has set up a commission to study the wearing of burqa in France—a long garment that covers the entire body including the face. According to Sarkozy, the burqa “deprived women of identity” and believes it is unacceptable to have women in France as “prisoners behind netting”.
Nor is Sarkozy alone in such sentiments. French feminists have been particularly vocal about the burqa and like Sarkozy see it as a symbol of subservience. According to Silhem Habchi from the women’s rights group ‘Ni Putes, Ni Soumises’ (Neither Whores Nor Subjected), it is a symbol of fascism and “the Talibanisation of religion.” More than 50 MPs from across the political spectrum have called for restrictions on wearing burqa which they describe as a “coffin”.
Yet the actual number of burqa and niqaab (with eye-slit) wearers in France is low. Muslim groups estimate that there are perhaps only a few hundred women fully covering themselves out of a Muslim population of over 5 million. Ironically, many of those who fully cover are converts. 
Underneath the language of laicite and paternalism bares a history that only partly explains the fetishistic approach on the part of the state to maintain a particular French identity that is secular, European and homogeneous.
France’s past attests to a long struggle between the state and church which culminated in French laicite (secularism)—the strict division between the state and church. The 1905 law of secularity is enforced militantly but relevant to the current context, the law was founded on a homogeneous France that no longer exists today.
Since the 1970s, France has been growing in cultural diversity with the presence of cheap labour workers from its former colonies in the Maghreb. However, French attitude toward cultural diversity would suggest little has changed in the demographic makeup of the country. The state does not recognise minority rights and enforces a colonial-style assimilation model on its immigrants whereby they’re expected to assimilate into a French abstraction. Thus, religious and cultural rights are only approved in consideration of a particular French secularism and mainly relegated to the private. In the case of Islam, this has been hugely problematic considering the private and public aren’t divided as such in matters of religious practice. The hijab has become symbolic of this contention.
An interesting debate occurred on Al Jazeera between director of Human Rights Watch in Paris Jean-Marie Fardeau, writer Anne Elizabeth Moutet and Saudi media personality in the Middle East, Muna Abdulsulayman. I’m in agreement with Abdulsulayman that the burqa isn’t obligatory in Islam and shouldn’t be defended as such, but I think she should have really stressed the right for a woman to choose to wear it. I’ve blogged about the burqa in France here and here in note of this, however, I pointed out in my post that I do believe that a woman’s right to choose how to express her religion (her interpretation of what modesty is) or her culture as she sees fit is fundamental to her dignity and should be protected. So, it is a matter of choice—whether we agree with it or not is irrelevant.
My other main objection to the proposed ban of the burqa is within the context of the 2004 legislation which prohibits the wearing of “ostentatious religious symbols” in public schools and government offices. Though it was claimed it was not specifically targeting any religious group, it mainly affected the wearing of headscarves for young Muslim women. Like they have been with the burqa issue, French feminists were equally as vocal and supported the ban. Well known French feminists like Anne Vigerie, the leader of a feminist think tank and Elisabeth Badinter reinforced the media’s theme of associating the hijab with Islamic extremism, viewing the headscarf as ‘le drapeu sur la tete” (flag on the head) that confirms the underdeveloped status of women in radical Islam.
The ban too was justified with the claim it was to ‘protect’ women from religious misogyny. In actuality, these debates are emphatically demonstrating the state’s attempt to eradicate the presence of Islam in public.
In its attempt to justify the violation of basic religious and cultural freedoms, France has vehemently responded to criticism explaining that it is for the state’s security. From what exactly? A type of dress worn by a ridiculously small minority of women? It’s interesting to note that at the time of the 2004 ban, the number of women wearing it was small in proportion to the total Muslim population. But in both cases the hysteria that the headscarf and burqa has whipped up would suggest that it is worn by millions striving to dominate French society.
French philosopher Alain Badiou writes that it is fear that drives such criticism of ‘foreign’ (Muslim) dress. The justification for protecting a secular identity is a front to undermine Islam in France, and this is closely tied with another part of France’s history: the French conquest of Algeria in 1830. The country suffers from a pathological fear of a ‘Muslim threat’ born in the Algerian revolutionary struggle against French colonialism. The hijab in its haik form was used as a form of national assertion and a reclaiming of a Muslim and cultural identity. Thus, the same French mission to civilise Muslim women persists today. French Muslim women are being ‘unveiled’ as part of a contemporary French colonial mission civilisatrice, in order to ‘teach’ the Muslim Other the superiority of Western knowledge and culture.
Today, the presence of the hijab in whatever form is one that offends. This is because it’s a symbol of the failure to ‘civilise’ the Algerian and by extension, Muslims. The burqa’s presence awakens a French fear and humiliation of the ‘loss’ of Algeria and the historical defeat to Islam. It is also symbolic of the irreducible difference and thus the unassimilability of Islam. Europeans –in this case French– identity is conveniently constructed to contrast with the other (Muslim) who do not belong in Europe.
These fears are accentuated further in the post 911 context in which Islam and Muslims have become victims of a bogeyman mindset which has had major implications on Muslims: They are the ‘enemy within’–dehumanised to the point of irrelevance.
So the current burqa issue can only be understood in its proper context which recognises Europe’s history with the Muslim world, France’s colonisation of the Maghreb and the current 911 political climate where Islamophobia has permeated all levels of European society.
Women as symbols in Iranian protests
June 26, 2009
Sahar
I’ve been carefully watching the events unfolding in Iran in the aftermath of the elections in which Mahmoud Ahmedinejad was declared President of Iran. Of course the debate on whether the elections were rigged or not has dominated the narrative but what’s been interesting is Western mainstream media have taken a special interest in covering this election but with a clear bias. Western media have categorically taken the side of defeated candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi. We have been exposed to dramatic coverage of chaos in Iranian streets and many have gone as far to say that we’re witnessing another 1979 revolution style uprising. Of course anyone who is familiar with Iran and is history would realize the protests we’re witnessing today are miniscule to that of the protests of the late 1970s which led to a democratic theocracy led by Ayatollah Khomeini. I have my doubts about the supposed rigging of the elections and the unpopularity of Ahmedinejad but it’s been fascinating to watch how the story is being told to the world through the lens of new media like Twitter, You Tube and Facebook.
The most dominant images flooding out of Iran have been of young Iranian women. They seem to be at the forefront of the resistance. Many of these women are in fashionable attire wearing the most high fashion labels, beautiful and wearing loose hijab. This latter point may sound minor but in a country like Iran, the politics of the hijab has had powerful consequences. Covering and uncovering has been infused with political messages since the Pahlavi period—revolving around binary constructions of ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’. In his effort to ‘modernise’ Iran through European eyes, the Reza Shah banned the hijab in 1936; although the ban was uplifted, the hijab was perceived by the state and higher classes as a symbol of Iran’s backwardness, a hindrance for women’s rights and progress.
Almost hijabless yet oh so chic Mousavi supporter
Infusing the hijab with such political meaning has meant the very act of covering and uncovering is a political act. So it is not a surprise then that during the revolutionary period in which masses of Iranians protested against the Shah’s despotism, women of all classes donned the hijab (its black chador form) as an act of defiance against the monarchy and also in class solidarity. The visibility of the hijab has meant that both ‘modernisers’ and ‘religious orthodoxy’ have used it to validate their ideology. The current state’s endorsement of the black chador wearing women is considered by the current regime as the ‘ideal’ woman of the nation. Shahla Sherkat calls it the ‘official uniform’. According to Nima Naghibi resistance against the regime has continues through dress—whether it’s a different coloured hijab or revealing a fringe—the bad hijabi phenomenon.
The black chador wearing female supporter of Ahmedinejad.
The hijab’s history is coming to the fore as we witness the political consequences of women’s image. It is through women’s body where the politics of validation is played out. Although it hasn’t been shown much in the media, there are young women on both sides of the political spectrum which interestingly show the ‘modern’ and ‘tradition’ dichotomy that’s always been a cause of contention in Iran– the chador-wearing Ahmedinejad supporter versus the Gucci wearing-dyed fringe-loose hijab wearing Mousavi supporter. Or so it seems.
Coupled with such imagery, the video of Nega-Agha Soltan, a 26 year old Iranian woman who was killed in a street protest has become the symbol of Iranian women’s efforts to fight Islamic fundamentalism. Like the hijab, her death– captured in her bloody face that’s been disseminated around the world –has become the symbol of the regime’s misogyny and a justification for political dissent.
Mimi from Threadbared has written a brilliant analysis of the hijab in media coverage of the protests. She writes “the image of the Iranian woman in her loose headscarf is not a straightforward arrow from Islamic backwardness to liberal progress, but a nuanced and multi-dimensional map of political discourse and struggle”. Indeed, on the one hand it certainly will be interpreted as a yearning for liberal democracy by Westerners but as I argued in my thesis, the hijab’s meaning and power has been contingent upon political events in Iran and consequently has multiple dimensions and points of debate.
I also can’t help think that the overwhelming images of women in fashion attire, makeup and loose hijab has another dangerous implication: the wonderful potentials of opening Iran up further to consumer capitalist markets. The hijab, specifically the chador, is a hindrance to the exploitation of women’s bodies. Whereas, a loosening of the regime could mean unveiling the Iranian woman (and thus Iran) in which she becomes a more participatory member of global consumer culture. Her body will become more accessible and susceptible to consumer trends—a return to the Shah’s Falangi dolls. Of course this process is guised under the rubric of emancipation.
Whatever the results of these protests, it is becoming abundantly clear that the strong presence of women on both sides alongside men on the streets and other political campaigning is indicative of the historical mobilisation of women (during the revolution and the Iran-Iraq war 1980-88)) and the significance of the ‘woman question’ is one that cannot be ignored. Women’s active political participation is fiercely undermining the reductive perceptions many have of Iranian women who are often depicted as victims of Islamic theocracy and silenced by their hijab. They are therefore complicating the Iranian woman and showing that her position is constantly shifting and being contested.
F
Sahar
Farah
