The Permission to Narrate

Sahar

Feminists Naomi Wolf and Philis Chesler have recently been debating the topic of the ‘veil’ and Muslim women. It’s become somewhat of a heated debate with both sides claiming they have a better insight into the lives of Muslim women. This audacious insight of course does not actually rely on actual engagement with Muslim women, nor the participation of Muslim women in this debate– aside from brief references that are then interpreted and made to make sense through the position of both women.

Just a brief overview of the debate first:  Wolf’s experience in Morocco led her to make the following claim that Muslim women are not necessarily restricted by their religious attire (chador and headscarf) and in fact feel liberated, especially sexually. From these observations, Wolf calls for a more nuanced approach in understanding women’s freedom. Chesler has responded with the charge that Wolf is legitimizing oppressive practices and responds with outrageous statements that conclude with the following: Muslim women are oppressed in Islamic attire, they lack agency, and the Western approach to liberation is more fitting.

What interested me was the assumption of these women to debate the issue of the hijab (whatever forms of it) and the experiences of Muslim women without involving a practicing Muslim woman who observes the hijab or at least be a part of the community and faith that practices it,  and thus be more qualified on the subject.

Wolf attempts to recognise the opinions of Moroccan women and speaks on their experiences, but her own understanding of Islam, Muslim women or even the subject of Muslim dress seems to be too difficult for her when she confuses Pakistani dress (‘shalwar kameez’) with Moroccan Islamic dress which can come in the form of niqaab, abaya, jilbaba or just modestly dressed in loose pants/skirt/top and a headscarf.  So Wolf not only ignores the differences in cultural dress—for the Muslim world is just one monolithic entity anyway– these differences don’t really exist and can all fall under the category of ‘traditional dress’ conveniently juxtaposed against Western ‘modern dress’. By wearing any traditional Muslim dress (‘shalwar kazmeez’), Wolf thinks she has direct access to the experiences of Muslim women. Dress therefore becomes the embodiment of Muslim women’s lives, and a way to access their world.

As for Chesler, she too does not have much credibility (not that she does in the first place considering her inane islamophobic and racist views on Palestinians and Muslims as a whole) when she declares that ‘most’ Muslim girls and women are not given a choice in wearing any Islamic dress.  She supports her claims by shamelessly citing two women (Hirsi Ali and Nouri Darwish) who have publicly renounced Islam and have built their careers on feeding Islamophobic hysteria in the West.  So Muslim women are spoken for either through an Islamophobic feminist or apostates who work for right-wing American think tanks bent on demonizing Muslims and Islam.

Putting these absurdities aside, I also find it telling how the debate treats Muslim women as objects in an exhibition, as spectacles, who function as objects to be analysed, observed, dissected, commented and repackaged to be easily consumed by a Western audience. Muslim women’s voices are only heard through interpretation of two white women (the subject) who assume the permission to narrate what it is like to be a Muslim woman who chooses to cover her head, in whatever form.

The alienness of Muslim culture is retold in the language of universalism (western norms and feminist ideals) to ease the anxiety of the Western observer towards difference. We see this in how Wolf insists that there are similar sentiments behind Islamic dress that Western feminists can relate to “This may not be expressed in a traditional Western feminist set of images, but it is a recognisably Western feminist set of feelings”.  Or in the intimacy of Muslim homes, the presence of designer labels like Victoria Secret is comforting. Muslim mores are measured against white Western standards and only legitimised and accepted once shared values and practices are recognised. To send the reassuring message: “see, they are just like ‘us’”.

The notion of white being a signifier of objectivity is imperative here. Wolf, like the colonial traveler, is an objective observer who can participate in the local customs and wear the traditional dress– yet can remain ‘detached’ from her surrounding in order to make perceptive observations that can be taken away for examination.  Thus, both women’s subjectivities as white, upper-middle class Western women are not called into question when they speak on behalf of Muslim women in this debate. It is in fact this same subjectivity that permits them to narrate for Muslim women.  They speak with an unquestionable authority as whiteness has a moral-worth of its own masquerading as universal and never questioned.

So it is not that Muslim women are silenced by her hijab, as many white  feminists like to claim, but because they are made to be silent by those who wish to speak for them.

Europe, Islamophobia and Lone Wolves

Farah

Marwa al-Sherbini was a 31-year old Egyptian wife, mother, daughter and sister. She was stabbed in court by a German man identified as Axel W. They were in court at Alex W’s appeal against a fine for insulting her in 2008. He called her a terrorist and Islamist while she was playing with her three-year-old son in a park. The prosecutor of Alex W’s impending murder charge, Christian Avenarius, said: “It was very clearly a xenophobic attack of a fanatical lone wolf.” But as Sobia over at MMW points out in her response, “[Alex W’s] hate of Muslims and derogatory views of Muslims were not his own creation, but rather a creation of the world he lives in. His actions were not that of a lone wolf, but rather of one living in a society full of Islamophobia.”

While running the risk of my voice drowning in a sea of other blog posts, an interesting discussion has developed in response to Sobia’s post. Is the “lone wolf argument” valid, or is his attack symptomatic of a wider, deeper racist Islam and Muslims gripping Europe and America? More importantly, is it valid to analyse Alex W’s actions within a broader context (systematic Islamophobia) while denying context to violence that occurs within Muslim communities and/or by Muslims?

Nesrine Malik at the Guardian also asks the same question. “Muslims … constantly protest that the actions of a few extremists should not be allowed to denigrate Islam and its adherents as a whole – but this is exactly what they are doing themselves in connection with Europeans and the actions of Axel W.” The problem I have with this argument is that it’s simplistic. Manifestations of racism within Europe and America must be understood within a history of institutionalised racism not only against Muslims but other minority groups like gypsies and slaves. You can’t then flip the position and argue to understand extremism in the same way. Attributing acts of violence committed by Muslims to a broader context of “Islam” to me suggests that such acts are justified by Islam. It also ignores other potent issues which must also be looked at when analysing such acts. The other problem I have is that when acts of extremism or domestic violence occur by Muslims or within Muslim communities, the default reaction everyone has is to firstly, blame the whole of Islam and then secondly ask every Muslim to explain what happened. Every single time! It’s like a never ending car trip, you know, “are we there yet are we there yet?”

Take Aasiya Hassan’s murder. Some of the first headlines that started emerging involved some form of the words honour killing, Islam and wife-bashing Muslim husband, and included with immediate comparisons to the usual three countries (Afghanistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia) and the oppression of women there. Never mind the fact that there was a history of domestic violence in the marriage or that both weren’t actually from Afghanistan, Iran OR Saudi Arabia. And don’t even mention the fact that both actually grew up in the US, because that would suggest that something other than Islam (say, something like diaspora or alienation in a foreign land) actually contributed to the husband’s mental instability ( but note I say “contribute” not “justify”.) This isn’t to undermine the oppression of women in those countries, but the misogyny in say Saudi Arabia isn’t really comparable to case of domestic violence in the USA – different analyses are required.*

So racism in Europe and America must be understood within a historical context. The ideological justification for racism has been maintained for centuries. The Enlightenment provided the colonial powers with an explicitly racist justification for the colonial project. The period allowed the colonial powers to justify the dehumanization of colonial subjects. And that they did extremely well. Racism today might not be so strictly ‘race-based’ anymore, but like John Solomos and Les Beck point out race today is “coded as culture.” This is the new racism – defined by George Fredrickson as “a way of thinking about difference that reifies and essentializes culture rather than genetic endowment, or in other words, makes culture do the work of race.” The institutionalized structures of racist ideology remain operative, but they now stigmatize cultural or religious groups as dangerous and foreign. And the fact remains: hostility and discrimination against Muslims “represent a reversion to the way that the differences between ethnoracial groups could be made to seem indelible and unbridgeable.”

While writing this post, I found this article courtesy of the BBC. Neo-Nazi convicted of terror plan?? The poor misunderstood neo-Nazis! Seriously though guys, we should consider his acts to be of a lone-wolf style, his opinions not attributable to other neo-Nazis, and not an extension of Nazism in the 1930s. Otherwise, we could erroneously blame the neo-Nazi community and contribute to a culture of fear and hate towards … neo-Nazis… wait, what’s my argument again? I think I’m confused.

Yes, all violence must be understood contextually. So too must the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment and Islamophobia around Europe and America be understood. But that context is born out of the Enlightenment, has a history of colonialism and the subjugation and domination over the subaltern Other.

*The idea of a ‘global sisterhood’ of women and the so-called ‘universal’ female experience won’t be discussed here, mostly because I think such claims are a load of bull used to justify the ability of Western feminists to talk about issues affecting subaltern women in a way totally divorced from any real context.

The ‘enemy’ within: Muslims in France

Sahar

It seems France hasn’t had sufficient amount of negative attention. News has been buzzing on the latest debate over dress in the country. French President Nicolas Sarkozy has set up a commission to study the wearing of burqa in France—a long garment that covers the entire body including the face. According to Sarkozy, the burqa “deprived women of identity” and believes it is unacceptable to have women in France as “prisoners behind netting”.

Nor is Sarkozy alone in such sentiments. French feminists have been particularly vocal about the burqa and like Sarkozy see it as a symbol of subservience. According to Silhem Habchi from the women’s rights group ‘Ni Putes, Ni Soumises’ (Neither Whores Nor Subjected), it is a symbol of fascism and “the Talibanisation of religion.” More than 50 MPs from across the political spectrum have called for restrictions on wearing burqa which they describe as a “coffin”.

Yet the actual number of burqa and niqaab (with eye-slit) wearers in France is low. Muslim groups estimate that there are perhaps only a few hundred women fully covering themselves out of a Muslim population of over 5 million. Ironically, many of those who fully cover are converts.

Underneath the language of laicite and paternalism bares a history that only partly explains the fetishistic approach on the part of the state to maintain a particular French identity that is secular, European and homogeneous.

France’s past attests to a long struggle between the state and church which culminated in French laicite (secularism)—the strict division between the state and church. The 1905 law of secularity is enforced militantly but relevant to the current context, the law was founded on a homogeneous France that no longer exists today.

Since the 1970s, France has been growing in cultural diversity with the presence of cheap labour workers from its former colonies in the Maghreb. However, French attitude toward cultural diversity would suggest little has changed in the demographic makeup of the country. The state does not recognise minority rights and enforces a colonial-style assimilation model on its immigrants whereby they’re expected to assimilate into a French abstraction. Thus, religious and cultural rights are only approved in consideration of a particular French secularism and mainly relegated to the private. In the case of Islam, this has been hugely problematic considering the private and public aren’t divided as such in matters of religious practice.  The hijab has become symbolic of this contention.

An interesting debate occurred on Al Jazeera between director of Human Rights Watch in Paris Jean-Marie Fardeau, writer Anne Elizabeth Moutet and Saudi media personality in the Middle East, Muna Abdulsulayman. I’m in agreement with Abdulsulayman that the burqa isn’t obligatory in Islam and shouldn’t be defended as such, but I think she should have really stressed the right for a woman to choose to wear it. I’ve blogged about the burqa in France here and here  in note of this, however, I pointed out in my post that I do believe that a woman’s right to choose how to express her religion (her interpretation of what modesty is) or her culture as she sees fit is fundamental to her dignity and should be protected. So, it is a matter of choice—whether we agree with it or not is irrelevant.

My other main objection to the proposed ban of the burqa is within the context of the 2004 legislation which prohibits the wearing of “ostentatious religious symbols” in public schools and government offices. Though it was claimed it was not specifically targeting any religious group, it mainly affected the wearing of headscarves for young Muslim women. Like they have been with the burqa issue, French feminists were equally as vocal and supported the ban. Well known French feminists like Anne Vigerie, the leader of a feminist think tank and Elisabeth Badinter reinforced the media’s theme of associating the hijab with Islamic extremism, viewing the headscarf as ‘le drapeu sur la tete” (flag on the head) that confirms the underdeveloped status of women in radical Islam.

The ban too was justified with the claim it was to ‘protect’ women from religious misogyny. In actuality, these debates are emphatically demonstrating the state’s attempt to eradicate the presence of Islam in public.

In its attempt to justify the violation of basic religious and cultural freedoms, France has vehemently responded to criticism explaining that it is  for the state’s security. From what exactly? A type of dress worn by a ridiculously small minority of women? It’s interesting to note that at the time of the 2004 ban, the number of women wearing it was small in proportion to the total Muslim population. But in both cases the hysteria that the headscarf and burqa has whipped up would suggest that it is worn by millions striving to dominate French society.

French philosopher Alain Badiou writes that it is fear that drives such criticism of ‘foreign’ (Muslim) dress. The justification for protecting a secular identity is a front to undermine Islam in France, and this is closely tied with another part of France’s history:  the French conquest of Algeria in 1830. The country suffers from a pathological fear of a ‘Muslim threat’ born in the Algerian revolutionary struggle against French colonialism. The hijab in its haik form was used as a form of national assertion and a reclaiming of a Muslim and cultural identity. Thus, the same French mission to civilise Muslim women persists today. French Muslim women are being ‘unveiled’ as part of a contemporary French colonial mission civilisatrice, in order to ‘teach’ the Muslim Other the superiority of Western knowledge and culture.

Today,  the presence of the hijab in whatever form is one that offends. This is because it’s a symbol of the failure to ‘civilise’ the Algerian and by extension, Muslims. The burqa’s presence awakens a French fear and humiliation of the ‘loss’ of Algeria and the historical defeat to Islam. It is also symbolic of the irreducible difference and thus the unassimilability of Islam. Europeans –in this case French– identity is conveniently constructed to contrast with the other (Muslim) who do not belong in Europe. 

These fears are accentuated further in the post 911 context in which Islam and Muslims have become victims of a bogeyman mindset which has had  major implications on Muslims:  They are the ‘enemy within’–dehumanised to the point of irrelevance.

So the current burqa issue can only be understood in its proper context which recognises Europe’s history with the Muslim world, France’s colonisation of the Maghreb and the current 911 political climate where Islamophobia has permeated all levels of European society.

Women as symbols in Iranian protests

Sahar

I’ve been carefully watching the events unfolding in Iran in the aftermath of the elections in which Mahmoud Ahmedinejad was declared President of Iran.  Of course the debate on whether the elections were rigged or not has dominated the narrative but what’s been interesting is Western mainstream media have taken a special interest in covering this election but with a clear bias.  Western media have categorically taken the side of defeated candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi. We have been exposed to dramatic coverage of chaos in Iranian streets and many have gone as far to say that we’re witnessing another 1979 revolution style uprising. Of course anyone who is familiar with Iran and is history would realize the protests we’re witnessing today are miniscule to that of the protests of the late 1970s which led to a democratic theocracy led by Ayatollah Khomeini.  I have my doubts about the supposed rigging of the elections and the unpopularity of Ahmedinejad but it’s been fascinating to watch how the story is being told to the world through the lens of new media like Twitter, You Tube and Facebook.

The most dominant images flooding out of Iran have been of young Iranian women.  They seem to be at the forefront of the resistance. Many of these women are in fashionable attire wearing the most high fashion labels, beautiful and wearing loose hijab. This latter point may sound minor but in a country like Iran, the politics of the hijab has had powerful consequences.  Covering and uncovering has been infused with political messages since the Pahlavi period—revolving around binary constructions of ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’. In his effort to ‘modernise’ Iran through European eyes, the Reza Shah banned the hijab in 1936; although the ban was uplifted, the hijab was perceived by the state and higher classes as a symbol of Iran’s backwardness, a hindrance for women’s rights and progress.

Almost hijabless yet oh so chic Mousavi supporter

Infusing the hijab with such political meaning has meant the very act of covering and uncovering is a political act. So it is not a surprise then that during the revolutionary period in which masses of Iranians protested against the Shah’s despotism, women of all classes donned the hijab (its black chador form) as an act of defiance against the monarchy and also in class solidarity. The visibility of the hijab has meant that both ‘modernisers’ and ‘religious orthodoxy’ have used it to validate their ideology. The current state’s endorsement of the black chador wearing women is considered by the current regime as the ‘ideal’ woman of the nation. Shahla Sherkat calls it the ‘official uniform’. According to Nima Naghibi resistance against the regime has continues through dress—whether it’s a different coloured hijab or revealing a fringe—the bad hijabi phenomenon.

The black chador wearing female supporter of Ahmedinejad.

The hijab’s history is coming to the fore as we witness the political consequences of women’s image. It is through women’s body where the politics of validation is played out.  Although it hasn’t been shown much in the media, there are young women on both sides of the political spectrum which interestingly show the ‘modern’ and ‘tradition’ dichotomy that’s always been a cause of contention in Iran– the chador-wearing Ahmedinejad supporter versus the Gucci wearing-dyed fringe-loose hijab wearing Mousavi supporter. Or so it seems.

The presence of Zahrad Rahvanard alongside her husband has greatly legitimized Mousavi’s position. She too is shown in a great deal in these images with her floral hijab, over a black layer—either a symbol of her compromising position or to show a sign of brightness –hope– underneath the blackness of the regime.

Coupled with such imagery, the video of Nega-Agha Soltan, a 26 year old Iranian woman who was killed in a street protest has become the symbol of Iranian women’s efforts to fight Islamic fundamentalism. Like the hijab, her death– captured in her bloody face that’s been disseminated around the world –has become the symbol of the regime’s misogyny and a justification for political dissent.

Mimi from Threadbared has written a brilliant analysis of the hijab in media coverage of the protests. She writes “the image of the Iranian woman in her loose headscarf is not a straightforward arrow from Islamic backwardness to liberal progress, but a nuanced and multi-dimensional map of political discourse and struggle”. Indeed, on the one hand it certainly will be interpreted as a yearning for liberal democracy by Westerners but as I argued in my thesis, the hijab’s meaning and power has been contingent upon political events in Iran and consequently has multiple dimensions and points of debate.

I also can’t help think that the overwhelming images of women in fashion attire, makeup and loose hijab has another dangerous implication: the wonderful potentials of opening Iran up further to consumer capitalist markets. The hijab, specifically the chador, is a hindrance to the exploitation of women’s bodies. Whereas, a loosening of the regime could mean unveiling the Iranian woman (and thus Iran) in which she becomes a more participatory member of global consumer culture.  Her body will become more accessible and susceptible to consumer trends—a return to the Shah’s Falangi dolls. Of course this process is guised under the rubric of emancipation.

Whatever the results of these protests, it is becoming abundantly clear that the strong presence of women on both sides alongside men on the streets and other political campaigning is indicative of the historical mobilisation of women (during the revolution and the Iran-Iraq war 1980-88)) and the significance of the ‘woman question’ is one that cannot be ignored.  Women’s active political participation is fiercely undermining the reductive perceptions many have of Iranian women who are often depicted as victims of Islamic theocracy and silenced by their hijab.  They are therefore complicating the Iranian woman and showing that her position is constantly shifting and being contested.

Muslim women and choice in marriage

Sahar

Recently I saw the Doha Debates which is a show that debates controversial political, social and religious issues.  Journalist and mediator, Tim Sebastian proposes a motion and the speakers on the panel discuss the topic at length. The audience then has an opportunity to respond to the panel. The latest motion proposed was ‘This house believes that Muslim women should be free to marry anyone they choose’.

There were four speakers on the panel. For the motion there was American Muslim feminist Asra Nomani who has authored several books. Also for the motion, there was Dr. Muhammad Habash a Parliamentarian and Cleric.  Against the motion were Shaykh Yasir Qadhi and Dr. Thuraya Al Arrayed, a Saudi writer, columnist and member of the advisory board of the Arab Thought Foundation.

Nomani began the debate with an emotional tone, declaring that Muslim women face barriers and that “just about every Muslim woman” encounters these barriers and internalizes them, and that she does not have the right to choose when it comes to marriage. She then directly addresses Muslim women and reassures them that she doesn’t wish that they suffer forced or loveless marriages.

With the way Nomani is carrying on, you’d think she was convinced she was shaking the very sheltered world of Muslim women. Apparently we’re not aware of our rights!  In her self-aggrandising, Nomani homogenises Muslim women’s experience and assumes that every Muslim woman has had the same experience as her. That yes, we are all doomed to the same fate.  True, there are Muslim women like Nomani who marry either through some sort of coercion but just to keep their family happy–I also agree with her point that these women will be the ones who share their bed with their husbands at the end. However, Nomani seems to think that these experiences are the experiences of the vast majority of Muslim women–where we are helpless beings who are victims of our community and our imposing families who Nomani assumes don’t want the best for us. She thus undermines the importance of family within the context of Muslim marriage.  I’m not saying women have to follow the decisions of families but many women and men will be thinking that family does matter in many of the decisions we make for ourselves, including marriage.  In other words, choice comes with responsibility and it  does at times mean we consider everything, not just ourselves.

Nomani’s entire argument is predicated on a particular construction of the Muslim woman which she deploys to legitimise her claim: She is just chattel, in shackles, and silenced by her subjugation. Nomani belittles the minds of Muslim women because she assumes they lack agency of their own and cannot comprehend their supposed suffering.  In doing so, Nomani constructs herself as their savior, the enlightened one who recognises their oppression– the liberal light at the end of this oppressive dark tunnel that is their unfortunate experience.

I found it interesting that Nomani’s extremely liberal position was juxtaposed with the other Muslim woman who was opposed to the motion.  Dr. Al Arrayed opposes the motion because she believes that anyone 27 and under basis their decisions on physical attraction and that they are not responsible enough to be making important decisions like this– so the role of the family is essential.  Her simplistic position is mired by her lack of faith in young Muslim women and their responsible attitude to such issues like marriage—which a woman in the audience pointed out.  However, I do agree with Dr  Al Arrayed’s overall point that family is important in these decisions and it is dangerous to deny this reality because it could lead to women being isolated.   

What was interesting is the issue of children did not come up in the debate. For me, my decision to marry a Muslim man is affirmed when it comes to the faith of my children. I would not want my children to belong to any other faith but Islam. Keep in mind; this is not only an issue women who marry non-Muslims have to face but also men who do.

Supporting the motion, Dr. Habash, begins his defense declaring there is no compulsion in religion and so we should extend this to marriage too. (I think he was a little confused with his position and often would agree with the opposing side) However, no compulsion in religion does not mean a Muslim shouldn’t abide by the laws of her religion—she has the choice not to of course but if she wishes to practice her religion, there are certain rules and practices that need to be followed as part of worship.  Sure, a Muslim woman can marry who she wants, but the question here is, is there religious justification for this unlimited freedom?  Dr. Habash refers to the hadith of when the Prophet was approached by a woman who told him of how she was forced to marry but later agreed with her father’s decision. The Prophet then told her he’ll absolve the marriage but she assured him she was now happy in her marriage but wanted to let women know that the father has no right to do such a thing which the Prophet agreed.  Habash takes from this hadith the principle that women should be able to choose who she should marry, regardless of the faith of the person. However, as Shaykh Qadhi points out, we cannot be selective with our religion because Habash is ignoring what Islam has to say about a woman marrying a non-Muslim.  

As I listened to Nomani’s concern over the depressing fate of Muslim women, I thought, why isn’t she mentioning the importance of recognizing cultural ideas and customs that have infiltrated how we conceptualise and perceive Islam.? Her analysis was simple: Muslim women are downtrodden; there was no attempt to contextualise and understand this further.  To compensate for Nomani’s reductive observation, Shaykh Qadhi  (and Dr. Al Arrayed ) point out  that yes, there are women who are oppressed in our communities in the name of religion, but Islam is not responsible for any oppression that occurs, rather it is cultural and tribal prejudice which justify oppressive practices. These practices are the antithesis to Islam’s principles of equality and justice which are protected in its law. Importantly, Shaykh Qadhi explains how  this is not a problem of the uneducated In our community but those who have committed themselves to the study of religion, who may consciously or unconsciously introduce their own cultural prejudice that affects how they view Islam. This was imperative to the debate I thought because of the dichotomy that Nomani was desperately trying to establish.

Nomani was positing herself as the liberal defender of Muslim women against the oppressive religious leadership that Shaykh Qadhi—with his long beard (as opposed to the more subtle beard of Habash) represented.  When Shaykh Qadhi objected to her removal of any boundaries and warned that limitations are a part of our religion, she would turn to the audience and say “that is their interpretation” in her attempt to marginalise him. In fact, she was well prepared for this response and early on in the debate warned of the theological arguments that she claimed lay the barriers for women.

Shaykh Qadhi undermined this false dichotomy in pointing out that there are elements of the religious establishment who are tainted by cultural understandings and that we should resist this. However, Nomani wasn’t interested in hearing a Shaykh criticise women’s oppression in our community— that was simply not the role Nomani had decided for him.

Furthermore, Nomani seemed to think independent interpretations have more sway than scholarship consensus.  She fails to grasp the importance of having boundaries and unlimited freedom which any liberal will argue needs to be contextualized.  Nomani’s discrediting of scholarship reminds me of another Muslim journalist Irshad Manji who also has a similar position. I wrote about the dangers of such independent thinking divorced from engagement with Islamic scholarship and Sharia.  These women who have no credentials in such areas but have built careers by commenting on them–they differ from scholars like Amina Wadud and Fatima Mernissi who I am not necessarily agree with on many issues but I do respect their efforts to protect the rights of women by working within the traditional scholarship and delving into it to extrapolate their views. 

Like Manji, Nomani also legitimizes and justifies  her claim by making references to popular misconceptions of Islam in her quoting of Qur’anic verses out of their proper context: The supposed beating of women sanctioned in the Qur’an which Hamza Yusuf explains well here;  and forbidding friendship with Christians and Jews.  The latter she strategically mentioned because many would be aware of her friendship with Jewish journalist Daniel Pearl who was killed in Pakistan and thus admire her for not being the kind of Muslim she was painting those who disagree with her as.  Nomani’s use of these examples is not only offensive to Muslim women but also to their Islamic faith.  Nomani seems to think that this is an issue of a lack of liberty in Islamic understanding toward women but as Shaykh Qadir points out,  if we return to the Prophetic teaching in order to understand the status of women in Islam we will realize that our tradition is the place of vindication. The Prophetic period is where we can break away from a hermetic Islamic discourse and our cultural impinges on Islamic practices by looking at how women were a part of the political, economic and cultural community. The women of this period were successful business women (Khadija), scholars (Aisha), soldiers (Nuseiba) and specifically relevant to this debate is how Khadija herself had proposed to the Prophet. These men and women are models for the Ummah and aren’t understood as oppressed but liberated–they certainly do not fit into Nomani’s construction of Muslim women and Islam as a whole.

In the end, the motion was passed (62%). I was actually surprised but Shaykh Qadhi explains in his piece on the debate that it was likely to be because of the vagueness of the motion which stressed freedom to choose rather than Shariah ruling on the issue.  But the fact that these kinds of discussions are taking place between Muslims (both men and women)  is a step forward in providing a space to discuss issues that impact on the lives of Muslim women.

Multiculturalism in Australia

Farah

Recently Melbourne was named the third most liveable city in the world. Actually, five Australian cities were named in the top 10. To be honest I’m not too sure how any Australian city made it on the list, let alone Melbourne. Australia isn’t exactly an immigrant’s dream here is it? The Cronulla race riots in Sydney. Prime Minister Kevin Rudd thinks racist ‘jokes’ are pretty funny. Attacks on Indian students have also increased dramatically. In Melbourne Indian students make up 30% of assault and robbery victims.

Australia has always been promoted as a shining beacon of “multiculturalism”. But the reality is more complex than that. What is actually being promoted through Australia’s brand of ‘multiculturalism’? Actual “multiculturalism” and respect for difference, or superficial banality? Seyla Benhabib has written quite a lot about the emerging politics of difference. And settler societies like Australia aren’t the only ones struggling over the question of cultural citizenship. France had the most publicised example of this with their hijab ban (Sahar blogged about it last year).

The media plays a large role in both reflecting and challenging society’s values and Australia is no exception. The Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) is a publically funded broadcasting radio and TV network and started broadcasting in 1979, the heyday of ‘multicultural’ government policies. Their aim is to “provide multilingual and multicultural radio and television services that inform, educate and entertain all Australians and, in doing so, reflect Australia’s multicultural society”. It was the first station in Australia to have ethnic news presenters. Recently the station aired three shows with Muslim characters – Kick, billed as a “romantic comedy” featured a Lebanese Muslim family, and East West 101, a drama show centred around Zane Malik an Arab Muslim police officer, and the struggles he faced working in a Sydney police

Don Hany as Zane Malik (left), the cast of East West 101, right

station. Last year SBS also aired Salam Cafe, a panel/talk show with young Muslims using humour to discuss the ‘lighter’ side of being a young Muslim in Australia.

What they all have in common is their aim to present a ‘multicultural’ Australia. But it is questionable whether the shows are successful in that respect. Kick and East West 101 did portray some strong characters and addressed some topical issues, as much as is possible in a prime-time TV shows anyway. One of the female Muslim characters in Kick was struggling with her sexuality. Layla was torn between her feelings for her female friend Jackie, and her arranged marriage to Sherif.

Layla Salim (left), portrayed by Nicole Chamoun

But the show didn’t really effectively deal with the issue. By the end of the series Layla is stuck in no-where land; she decides to break off the engagement, but doesn’t ‘come out’ to her family. At the end of the day, the show was a romantic comedy within which Layla and her struggle was a secondary plot device. All the show really did was flag the point and then move on to the next ridiculous situation Miki (the main character) found herself in. The Muslim characters suffered for lack of development. As a drama East West 101 was probably more successful. One of the directors sums up the purpose of the show: “The audience will be seeing Australia through his Islamic eyes…Malik is a man searching for a place in this conflicted modern world.” And credit goes to the production company because it did have a number of refreshingly honest scenes within Malik’s home and local mosque.

Scenes from East West 101

But again, the show was primarily focused on Malik and his boss Snr Detective Crowley, so much so that the other characters (including his family) were under-developed.

Salam Cafe is different to both. It aired in early 2008 and was a 30-min weekly panel, and is promoted as being about Australian Muslims, rather than about Islam. Susan Carland, one of the show’s panellists and creators, says “It’s showing the human face of the Muslim community… People will see that we won’t eat their babies.” Salam Cafe does (attempt to) break traditional stereotypes down; it shows young, successful opinionated men and women, using humour to dispel common misconceptions. As one article puts it, Salam Cafe showed “women wearing hijabs making jokes about women wearing hijabs.” But the show (like Kick) is a comedy. It tended to undermine the seriousness of the issues themselves by making everything funny. For me the show also promoted a very superficial type of identity; one which was bound up in being ‘Aussie’ and throwing shrimps on barbeques. It challenged one stereotype by constructing another.

A scene from Salam Cafe

Carland is right in saying that most misconceptions about Islam centre on Muslim women, especially the hijab. In 2004 a young Muslim women was told she could not play in a football match unless she removed her hijab. And women are disproportionately featured in attacks of religious and racial violence. A large number of those assaults are occurring in and around Brunswick – the suburb featured in Kick. Director Esben Storm chose Brunswick because he grew up in the area and wanted to faithfully depict its cultural and religious diversity. Clearly ‘ethnic harmony’ isn’t all it’s cracked up to be. If anything Australian identity is inherently fragile and susceptible to internal and external pressures. As soon as something threatens that identity (like say bombings in Bali in 2002, or the Cronulla race riots in 2005) demonization of Muslims and Islam becomes the order of the day. Muslim women, especially hijabis, then bear the brunt of racist attacks because they’re an obvious symbol of the religion. But, challenging those stereotypes shouldn’t mean participating within the broader discourse of Australian nationalism.

Kevin Rudd came out strong against the attacks Indian students (obviously he had to, international students are a big source of revenue for State and Federal governments). I had such high hopes for this guy when the Labor party won the election. For one thing he’s fluent in standard Mandarin – which Western leader can claim fluency in an Asian language?. But, when faced with the news of increased attacks against Indian students Rudd felt the need to “point[..] out that Australians also were at risk of violence when they travelled to India.”

The PM promoting an Us vs Them mentality. TV shows on a “special” broadcasting service constructing a superficial Other. It doesn’t exactly fill you with confidence for the future does it? In the end, it all points to a very superficial approach to difference, and the maintenance of a specific Anglo-Australian identity.

Response to Obama’s Speech

Sahar

So Obama made his much anticipated speech in Cairo. Let’s ignore the bad choice of location and focus on the content of the speech. I don’t know what the big fuss is all about. He quotes the Qur’an and everyone is woozy in admiration. He makes a few obvious factual points about Islam’s contribution to the world and again everyone is in awe. But of course he should, I thought, he’s addressing the Muslim world.

In stark contrast to his predecessor, Bush, Obama’s political overtures sounded almost pleasant at times. There was no mention of the misnomer that had dominated the discourse of post-911: terrorism.

But anyone sounds better than Bush; it’s like comparing Obama to Satan. Amid the language of tolerance and universalism, he talked with Bush-like triumph about 911 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—only to remind us that America has no intention to remain there.  However, he leveled this assurance with the reminder that extremism must be confronted in all its forms.

He discussed the issue of Palestine-Israel, condemning Palestinian violence but not the systematic violence Israel has wrought in Gaza 2009, Lebanon 1978, 1982 and 2006 which culminated in the deaths of thousands of civilians.  He talked about the nuclear issue and made digs at Iran, but no mention of Israel’s warheads which sources say number up to 200.  But it’s not these insidious moments in Obama’s over-glorified speech that are my focus, but the reference to women’s rights.

There’s been a bit of an uproar by women’s groups and feminists who claim Obama either did not go far enough in defending women’s rights or disagreed with his defense of the hijab.  To my amusement, Annie Sugier, President of The League of Women’s International Law was seemingly appalled by Obama’s defense of the hijab. Sugier described it as “an immense slap in the face for the women in Algeria, Iran or Afghanistan who have died in atrocious conditions as a consequence of their refusal to wear what they considered to be the most radical sign of women’s oppression and of segregation between men and women”.

The violence that is meted out against women could not possibly have anything to do with the historical political instability of each country brought on from imperialism?  No? Perhaps Sugier is not aware of (or conveniently ignoring) the revivalism of the hijab throughout the region as a reassertion of national pride in Islam and its rich culture.

Relying on a Eurocentric hermetic discourse, she reduces the meaning of the hijab as symbolic of women’s oppression and continues, “To say that one wears the veil voluntarily does not efface the humiliation that it signifies for all women”.  What women is she talking about? Certainly not the women who are fighting for their right to wear it in France and the broader West? Or the women who choose to wear it for religious, nationalist/political, cultural purposes.  It is these women she arrogantly is deciding to speak for.

Fatemeh Fakhraie of MMW, who wrote at DoubleX had a different response.   Though I agree with Fakhraie’s overall response, her interpretation of Obama’s speech in reference to the hijab differed from my own. She states, “The bit about hijab was especially disappointing. In a region with unequal family laws, socially acceptable sexual harassment, and discriminatory legal codes, the hijab is hardly the main point of debate”.

Indeed, the hijab isn’t the main issue for Muslim women in Muslim countries; however, I think Obama’s point here wasn’t really in regards to Muslims in Muslim countries, but Muslims living in the West.  The issue of hijab has a profoundly symbolic meaning in the West. It touches on issues of racism, tolerance, national identity, multiculturalism, interfaith cross-cultural dialogue and human rights. These issues are deeply affecting Muslims as a whole, and the debates on the hijab throughout the West are indications of such points of contention. After all, Western attitudes toward the hijab play a crucial role in how the Western audience views what goes on in Muslim countries and even legitimises conflicts and invasions, as we saw in Afghanistan in 2001.  Such issues have furthered the tension between Muslims and Western countries, which Obama was attempting to address.

Fakhraie is right in observing the importance of Obama highlighting the gender inequality existing in Western countries, “We often forget that when we point our fingers at other countries and find things about their gender systems objectionable, we’re living in a glass house built upon obscene rates of discrimination, rape, and violence against women. That doesn’t absolve anyone, but Obama carefully reminded us that we are all moving forward together in improving things for women”.

Muslims often react to Western critics like Sugier by reminding them they have their own backyard to clean up.  Such responses have almost stifled the debate on women’s rights in a cross-cultural setting.  Perhaps Obama was aware of this when he says “issues of women’s equality are by no means an issue simply for Islam”.

So although I’m not intoxicated by Obama mania and had serious issues with aspects of his speech, his references to women’s rights were satisfactory.  Women’s rights groups critical of him  have just overreacted.  Obama was aware of the political landmine he was on and treaded lightly. He talked about rights for women in a holistic sense and did not patronisingly lecture the Muslim world. His comments did not smack of American arrogance, which is what we’ve grown accustomed to over the  past few years–to do so would have been politically disastrous.

Britain, Sharia and Gutter Journalism

Farah

Recently the British have been all up in arms about the takeover of their just and equitable legal system with the oppressive and discriminatory behemoth of sharia law. Initially I wanted to focus on one article I found at the Guardian website but soon found multiple examples of the same gutter journalism. You can read more here and here, and here. And here’s another example of exemplary reporting. There’s nothing sensationalist or bigoted in them at all. Instead of addressing the articles separately, in this post I want to address some of the common arguments against the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) and suggest that they are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Tribunal itself, and the role of sharia within Islamic countries.

The first MAT in England was established in December 2007 and has since expanded to a number of other locations across the UK. MAT is a form of alternative dispute resolution. Instead of going to court Muslims who accept the jurisdiction of MAT can use it to resolve a number of civil disputes. There are two arbitrators present at all disputes: one Islamic scholar and the other a qualified solicitor or barrister. They will determine the dispute with a mix of English law and Sharia law. The tribunal operates within the UK’s existing legal system. This allows any determination of proceedings by MAT to be enforced through higher courts, and also preserves the right of parties to appeal to the High Court for review of an order. From their website the founders say that “MAT will therefore, for the first time, offer the Muslim community a real and true opportunity to settle disputes in accordance with Islamic Sacred Law with the knowledge that the outcome as determined by MAT will be binding and enforceable.”

Unfortunately for the campaigners against Sharia legal pluralism isn’t a brave new world. In the USA Native American tribes exercise exclusive criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed in tribal territory by tribal members (see here). Similar courts institutionalising indigenous justice operate in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Appearance before an indigenous court applies in strict circumstances and only to indigenous offenders. For England their experience with legal pluralism comes not with sharia but with Jewish Beth Din courts. The Jewish courts have been operating for close to 100 years and resolve a wide variety of civil disputes, including divorces. This prior experience however hasn’t restrained the sensationalism in the debate on the role of sharia within British law. Most notable of the backlash is the “One Law for All” campaign. You can read their petition here. (All I have to say is if Ayaan Hirsi Ali supports the cause then you should definitely get behind it).

Assumption 1: Discrimination (aka BUT THE WOMEN! THE WOMEN! THINK OF THE MUSLIM WOMEN WHO WILL SUFFER!)
The first reaction people typically have to sharia is that it discriminates against women. Such a system should not be established in the UK because it ‘clashes’ with women’s fundamental human rights. In her reaction to sharia in Britain Anjum Ahmed-Mouj states “Religious law, used without due regard to the relative powerlessness of women and children in society and without proper and transparent monitoring can be and is used to strengthen and extend the control and abuse perpetrated by individuals.” The problem is that this position presents sharia as a monolithic, static entity. However the development of sharia and women’s experience under it are more complex than that. Sharia differs greatly from country to country, interacting with influences like culture, globalisation and Westernisation which transform its practice and codification in different countries. This isn’t to deny that disempowered women suffer under sharia law; but solely blaming the religion undermines the fact that discrimination in the application of sharia is sourced from other areas which influence and drive the development of sharia in a certain direction. Within the context of MAT it is important to note the tribunal operates within English law. Parties have right of review and the decisions will be made with a mix of Islamic and English law.

With that in mind it becomes difficult to maintain that it is solely sharia, and MAT by extension, that presents the biggest hurdle to the empowerment of British Muslim women. Additionally, jumping to the worst case discrimination scenario denies the empowerment that MAT provides to all Muslims by providing avenues of cultural and social development. Such a move increases social cohesion by acknowledging the Muslim community and the role that such a large minority plays within the UK.

Assumption 2: The extremes of punishment under Sharia (aka LOOK AT WHAT THEY DO OVER IN [INSERT MUSLIM COUNTRY HERE] TO THEIR CRIMINALS! IT’S SO BARBARIC! WE’RE BRITISH! WE DON’T TORTURE!)
The second assumption a number of the articles make is in relation to how wrongs are punished under sharia law. One article above states that “In some Muslim countries punishments handed out under the legal system have included beheadings, public floggings and thieves’ hands being chopped off.” Well if they do that in some Muslim countries then you certainly can’t allow sharia in Britain! While the author doesn’t attempt to define the ‘some’, the point is that sharia is brutal and unjust in the punishment meted out to Muslim offenders. It is worth repeating here that such representations of punishment under sharia law again present it as a static construction, and a particularly violent one as well.

Within the context of MAT, such representations distort the power of the tribunal over what it can and cannot do. The tribunal cannot hear criminal law matters, nor can it impose any form of corporal punishment. It states this quite clearly on their website. Its power is limited to hearing civil disputes only, and issuing orders for compensation. The tribunal can adjudicate on cases of domestic violence within the context of family disputes. However, it is required to pass all details to the police who will then decide whether to take the matter further. Such a blatant oversight on the part of the journalists can only be deemed intentional, in order to further sensationalise the matter and present sharia law (and Islam and all Muslims by extension) as diametrically opposed to British mores.

Assumption 3: The growing influence of Islam on society (aka THIS IS JUST THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG! THE MUSLIMS ARE GOING TO TAKE OVER ENGLAND ONE TRIBUNAL AT A TIME!)
Though this assumption is less overt than the others, it does underlie a number of the articles above. In particular one writer goes so far to state “there are several radical Islamist movements that are working hard to spread Islamic supremacy through the use of terrorism, intimidation, litigation and disinformation campaigns… A parallel legal system utilizing Sharia courts is likely to constitute one step toward expanding political Islam, rather than serving as the final request for a religious accommodation.”

Firstly, MAT is not a “parallel” legal system but rather could at best be described as a subordinate one. Secondly, its not even a “legal system” but rather an alternative dispute resolution tribunal which utilises sharia law and English law to determine disputes. Additionally, considering it can only determine civil disputes and also operates within the ambit of English law it is difficult to see how it is the so-called first step in expanding political Islam. The writers’ position is also at odds with official statistics of the Muslim population in Britain. 2001 data suggests Muslims make up 2.8% of the population in the UK. Unless the Muslim community has seen exponential growth in the past 8 years to figures that overtake the Anglo population it is difficult to see how exactly the Muslims will take over and where the support for a religious theocracy in Britain will come from. At another point in the article the same writer states that the ultimate goal of sharia law is “to replace democracies with Islamic theocracies”. Last time I checked sharia was a system of law, not a coup de tat.

Such representations like this of British Muslims and Islam perpetuate the discourse of the Other. They present Islam and Muslims as a threat to British society which cannot be contained. Similarly, the journalists suggest Muslims are a foreign element to Britain because they want an entirely separate legal structure to the “rest” of society. This distinction infers that Muslims must give up all traces of their religion and culture to assimilate into British society and be accepted by the public.

So does this sound the end of one law for all? It probably does, but “one law” isn’t a term that could be used to describe any legal system for a while. There is ample evidence to suggest that in post-colonial times the colonial powers allowed multiple legal systems based on local custom and religion to operate. In countries like the UK Muslim minorities have had a problematic existence and establishing and retaining a ‘Muslim’ identity has been particularly contentious. Ultimately what the journalists fail to acknowledge is that MAT allows for the recognition of minority groups and operates as a powerful inclusion tool. Recognition of an individual’s personal culture or in this case religion is extremely important. Denying all or part of a minority culture has drastic negative effects for identity and feelings of belonging.

For more information on MAT, see here for an interview with Maryam Namazie from the One Law For All campaign and Aina Khan, a lawyer who argues for Sharia Law. And also here for a 30 min video Judge Qureshi of the MAT giving a speech in Manchester about forced marriages and the role of the MAT.