Lubna Ahmed al-Hussein, Angela Merkel and “well built” female lawyers

Farah

One of the commenters on my burka ban post a couple of weeks ago led me to the story of Lubna Ahmed al-Hussein – a Sudanese journalist who was arrested along with 11 other women in a Khartoum café for breaking Sudanese indecency laws by wearing trousers. While 10 of her companions have pleaded guilty to the offence, al-Hussein has decided to challenge the law. She has come out quite strongly against the indecency laws, and has declared that she is willing to take her case to the highest court in Sudan and, if they do not rule in her favour, she is willing to be lashed “not 40, but 40,000 times”.

She was quoted in the Guardian as saying, “Islam does not say whether a woman can wear trousers or not … It is not about religion, it is about men treating women badly.” Similarly, in her article “Lubna, a case of subduing a woman’s body” published in Al-Horreya newspaper shortly after al-Hussein’s arrest Sudanese journalist Amal Habbani also highlights that this law and the treatment of al-Hussein was “not about fashion but a political tactic to intimidate and terrorize opponents.” Habbani has since been charged and fined by the government after the article was published.

Sudan has a long history of women’s activism, and the strong support Sudanese women and men have given Al-Hussein has been highlighted over the past weeks. This activism stretches back to the 1989 coup that put the NIF in power. In “Gender Politics and Islamization in Sudan” Sondra Hale highlights that women were at the forefront of the 1989 coup. She notes that women were far more than “the ‘Greek chorus’ of the Islamic revolution. They [were] the central organizers and socializers … these women were not only learning and interpreting Islam for themselves and other women, but were also militant, independent in spirit, and effective organizers in the movement.” Leaders like Hasan al-Turabi came out in strong support of the role of women in the new Sudan, including in his pamphlet “On the Position of Women in Islam and in Islamic Society” published in 1973. But Hale questions whether or not women can sustain such an activist role now that the NIF is consolidating their control. Take for example the indecency laws. They are a part of a broader campaign in which women are re-socialized and religious ideas and institutions manipulated to form new power relationships. But the campaign verges on essentializing Islam; women’s behavior in the name of the ‘ideal woman’ is being ideologically manipulated by male-controlled religio-political institutions.

Lubna Ahmed al-Hussein. Image via Sudan Tribune

The focus is solely been on her right to wear trousers, while ignoring the broader issue. This approach is adopted by the articles I found trawling through my Google search. People say sarcasm is the lowest form of wit, but honestly I think that award should go to the pun. Some of the more (lamer) article titles I came across were:

• “al-Hussein wears the pants”
• “Lubna Hussein, standing up to Sudanese law on who wears the pants”
and other predictable variations on “Guess who wear’s the pants”, “blah blah pants wearing”. Alternatively, there was
• “Fashion statement: A Sudanese woman risks a flogging over pants” (fashion statement? Really?)
• “Lubna Hussein makes an ass of the law”
• “Trouser martyr”
• “Martyr to her trousers”
which is probably a bit much – she’s not dead so can we lay off the martyr talk?

Discussions of appropriate clothing are certainly not restricted to Muslim women. In 2006 Australian judge Peter Young said that some ‘well built’ female lawyers wore inappropriately revealing clothing. In an opinion piece, he stated “It is clear that some female solicitors have no idea of appropriate court dress. The worst offenders are usually well-built women who expose at least the upper halves of their breasts, and as they lean forward to make a point to a judge sitting at a high level they present a most unwelcome display of bare flesh.” The opinion of a respected member of society in a country where supposedly ‘democratic’ values prevail – and that was only a couple of years ago. More recently (and when I say recent I mean yesterday) German Chancellor Angela Merkel and politician Vera Lengsfeld (both members of the conservative party) have come under fire for publishing an election ad campaign where both wore low-cut dresses which showed ample amounts of cleavage – apparently the ad lowered the tone of the election and was ‘inappropriate’.

While Merkel, Lengsfeld and all those well-built female lawyers aren’t breaking laws, people’s attitudes remain the same. I’m not downplaying the significance of al-Hussein’s situation; there is a concern she could be flogged and I don’t agree with laws that prosecute against ‘indecent’ clothing, whether that clothing is trousers or burqas. But the issue here is a lot bigger than just a right to wear pants and focussing on that right alone obscures the broader issue. In a second article called “Alienation and Belonging—Women’s Citizenship and Emanciation: Visions for Sudan’s Post-Islamist Future”, Hale notes that “one of the unanswered questions … is why women are … superficially on the agenda … and, yet, a vision for what a gender egalitarian society would look like is glossed over or ignored.” The right of a woman to control her own body emerges in a number of contexts in all countries in a number of areas, including right to wear clothing free from legal constraints. These issues relate to broader questions about the role of women. What is deemed appropriate/inappropriate in certain contexts? Do we have a right to dictate by law the choices women make? And what type of national identity is being dictated to women, and being constructed over our bodies?

While we wait for an answer to those questions, I want to start a campaign. Not about al-Hussein – she already has ample support both in Sudan and across the world (Sarkozy has even jumped on the bandwagon). My campaign? Free Merkel and Lengsfeld’s cleavage from our traditional and backward attitudes. Do you want a society in which your daughter can’t show off her cleavage (if she has any, and if she doesn’t she can always get implants – not that I’m suggesting your daughter conform to a particular standard of beauty)? Come on people, do it for the kids.

The ‘enemy’ within: Muslims in France

Sahar

It seems France hasn’t had sufficient amount of negative attention. News has been buzzing on the latest debate over dress in the country. French President Nicolas Sarkozy has set up a commission to study the wearing of burqa in France—a long garment that covers the entire body including the face. According to Sarkozy, the burqa “deprived women of identity” and believes it is unacceptable to have women in France as “prisoners behind netting”.

Nor is Sarkozy alone in such sentiments. French feminists have been particularly vocal about the burqa and like Sarkozy see it as a symbol of subservience. According to Silhem Habchi from the women’s rights group ‘Ni Putes, Ni Soumises’ (Neither Whores Nor Subjected), it is a symbol of fascism and “the Talibanisation of religion.” More than 50 MPs from across the political spectrum have called for restrictions on wearing burqa which they describe as a “coffin”.

Yet the actual number of burqa and niqaab (with eye-slit) wearers in France is low. Muslim groups estimate that there are perhaps only a few hundred women fully covering themselves out of a Muslim population of over 5 million. Ironically, many of those who fully cover are converts.

Underneath the language of laicite and paternalism bares a history that only partly explains the fetishistic approach on the part of the state to maintain a particular French identity that is secular, European and homogeneous.

France’s past attests to a long struggle between the state and church which culminated in French laicite (secularism)—the strict division between the state and church. The 1905 law of secularity is enforced militantly but relevant to the current context, the law was founded on a homogeneous France that no longer exists today.

Since the 1970s, France has been growing in cultural diversity with the presence of cheap labour workers from its former colonies in the Maghreb. However, French attitude toward cultural diversity would suggest little has changed in the demographic makeup of the country. The state does not recognise minority rights and enforces a colonial-style assimilation model on its immigrants whereby they’re expected to assimilate into a French abstraction. Thus, religious and cultural rights are only approved in consideration of a particular French secularism and mainly relegated to the private. In the case of Islam, this has been hugely problematic considering the private and public aren’t divided as such in matters of religious practice.  The hijab has become symbolic of this contention.

An interesting debate occurred on Al Jazeera between director of Human Rights Watch in Paris Jean-Marie Fardeau, writer Anne Elizabeth Moutet and Saudi media personality in the Middle East, Muna Abdulsulayman. I’m in agreement with Abdulsulayman that the burqa isn’t obligatory in Islam and shouldn’t be defended as such, but I think she should have really stressed the right for a woman to choose to wear it. I’ve blogged about the burqa in France here and here  in note of this, however, I pointed out in my post that I do believe that a woman’s right to choose how to express her religion (her interpretation of what modesty is) or her culture as she sees fit is fundamental to her dignity and should be protected. So, it is a matter of choice—whether we agree with it or not is irrelevant.

My other main objection to the proposed ban of the burqa is within the context of the 2004 legislation which prohibits the wearing of “ostentatious religious symbols” in public schools and government offices. Though it was claimed it was not specifically targeting any religious group, it mainly affected the wearing of headscarves for young Muslim women. Like they have been with the burqa issue, French feminists were equally as vocal and supported the ban. Well known French feminists like Anne Vigerie, the leader of a feminist think tank and Elisabeth Badinter reinforced the media’s theme of associating the hijab with Islamic extremism, viewing the headscarf as ‘le drapeu sur la tete” (flag on the head) that confirms the underdeveloped status of women in radical Islam.

The ban too was justified with the claim it was to ‘protect’ women from religious misogyny. In actuality, these debates are emphatically demonstrating the state’s attempt to eradicate the presence of Islam in public.

In its attempt to justify the violation of basic religious and cultural freedoms, France has vehemently responded to criticism explaining that it is  for the state’s security. From what exactly? A type of dress worn by a ridiculously small minority of women? It’s interesting to note that at the time of the 2004 ban, the number of women wearing it was small in proportion to the total Muslim population. But in both cases the hysteria that the headscarf and burqa has whipped up would suggest that it is worn by millions striving to dominate French society.

French philosopher Alain Badiou writes that it is fear that drives such criticism of ‘foreign’ (Muslim) dress. The justification for protecting a secular identity is a front to undermine Islam in France, and this is closely tied with another part of France’s history:  the French conquest of Algeria in 1830. The country suffers from a pathological fear of a ‘Muslim threat’ born in the Algerian revolutionary struggle against French colonialism. The hijab in its haik form was used as a form of national assertion and a reclaiming of a Muslim and cultural identity. Thus, the same French mission to civilise Muslim women persists today. French Muslim women are being ‘unveiled’ as part of a contemporary French colonial mission civilisatrice, in order to ‘teach’ the Muslim Other the superiority of Western knowledge and culture.

Today,  the presence of the hijab in whatever form is one that offends. This is because it’s a symbol of the failure to ‘civilise’ the Algerian and by extension, Muslims. The burqa’s presence awakens a French fear and humiliation of the ‘loss’ of Algeria and the historical defeat to Islam. It is also symbolic of the irreducible difference and thus the unassimilability of Islam. Europeans –in this case French– identity is conveniently constructed to contrast with the other (Muslim) who do not belong in Europe. 

These fears are accentuated further in the post 911 context in which Islam and Muslims have become victims of a bogeyman mindset which has had  major implications on Muslims:  They are the ‘enemy within’–dehumanised to the point of irrelevance.

So the current burqa issue can only be understood in its proper context which recognises Europe’s history with the Muslim world, France’s colonisation of the Maghreb and the current 911 political climate where Islamophobia has permeated all levels of European society.

Britain, Sharia and Gutter Journalism

Farah

Recently the British have been all up in arms about the takeover of their just and equitable legal system with the oppressive and discriminatory behemoth of sharia law. Initially I wanted to focus on one article I found at the Guardian website but soon found multiple examples of the same gutter journalism. You can read more here and here, and here. And here’s another example of exemplary reporting. There’s nothing sensationalist or bigoted in them at all. Instead of addressing the articles separately, in this post I want to address some of the common arguments against the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) and suggest that they are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Tribunal itself, and the role of sharia within Islamic countries.

The first MAT in England was established in December 2007 and has since expanded to a number of other locations across the UK. MAT is a form of alternative dispute resolution. Instead of going to court Muslims who accept the jurisdiction of MAT can use it to resolve a number of civil disputes. There are two arbitrators present at all disputes: one Islamic scholar and the other a qualified solicitor or barrister. They will determine the dispute with a mix of English law and Sharia law. The tribunal operates within the UK’s existing legal system. This allows any determination of proceedings by MAT to be enforced through higher courts, and also preserves the right of parties to appeal to the High Court for review of an order. From their website the founders say that “MAT will therefore, for the first time, offer the Muslim community a real and true opportunity to settle disputes in accordance with Islamic Sacred Law with the knowledge that the outcome as determined by MAT will be binding and enforceable.”

Unfortunately for the campaigners against Sharia legal pluralism isn’t a brave new world. In the USA Native American tribes exercise exclusive criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed in tribal territory by tribal members (see here). Similar courts institutionalising indigenous justice operate in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Appearance before an indigenous court applies in strict circumstances and only to indigenous offenders. For England their experience with legal pluralism comes not with sharia but with Jewish Beth Din courts. The Jewish courts have been operating for close to 100 years and resolve a wide variety of civil disputes, including divorces. This prior experience however hasn’t restrained the sensationalism in the debate on the role of sharia within British law. Most notable of the backlash is the “One Law for All” campaign. You can read their petition here. (All I have to say is if Ayaan Hirsi Ali supports the cause then you should definitely get behind it).

Assumption 1: Discrimination (aka BUT THE WOMEN! THE WOMEN! THINK OF THE MUSLIM WOMEN WHO WILL SUFFER!)
The first reaction people typically have to sharia is that it discriminates against women. Such a system should not be established in the UK because it ‘clashes’ with women’s fundamental human rights. In her reaction to sharia in Britain Anjum Ahmed-Mouj states “Religious law, used without due regard to the relative powerlessness of women and children in society and without proper and transparent monitoring can be and is used to strengthen and extend the control and abuse perpetrated by individuals.” The problem is that this position presents sharia as a monolithic, static entity. However the development of sharia and women’s experience under it are more complex than that. Sharia differs greatly from country to country, interacting with influences like culture, globalisation and Westernisation which transform its practice and codification in different countries. This isn’t to deny that disempowered women suffer under sharia law; but solely blaming the religion undermines the fact that discrimination in the application of sharia is sourced from other areas which influence and drive the development of sharia in a certain direction. Within the context of MAT it is important to note the tribunal operates within English law. Parties have right of review and the decisions will be made with a mix of Islamic and English law.

With that in mind it becomes difficult to maintain that it is solely sharia, and MAT by extension, that presents the biggest hurdle to the empowerment of British Muslim women. Additionally, jumping to the worst case discrimination scenario denies the empowerment that MAT provides to all Muslims by providing avenues of cultural and social development. Such a move increases social cohesion by acknowledging the Muslim community and the role that such a large minority plays within the UK.

Assumption 2: The extremes of punishment under Sharia (aka LOOK AT WHAT THEY DO OVER IN [INSERT MUSLIM COUNTRY HERE] TO THEIR CRIMINALS! IT’S SO BARBARIC! WE’RE BRITISH! WE DON’T TORTURE!)
The second assumption a number of the articles make is in relation to how wrongs are punished under sharia law. One article above states that “In some Muslim countries punishments handed out under the legal system have included beheadings, public floggings and thieves’ hands being chopped off.” Well if they do that in some Muslim countries then you certainly can’t allow sharia in Britain! While the author doesn’t attempt to define the ‘some’, the point is that sharia is brutal and unjust in the punishment meted out to Muslim offenders. It is worth repeating here that such representations of punishment under sharia law again present it as a static construction, and a particularly violent one as well.

Within the context of MAT, such representations distort the power of the tribunal over what it can and cannot do. The tribunal cannot hear criminal law matters, nor can it impose any form of corporal punishment. It states this quite clearly on their website. Its power is limited to hearing civil disputes only, and issuing orders for compensation. The tribunal can adjudicate on cases of domestic violence within the context of family disputes. However, it is required to pass all details to the police who will then decide whether to take the matter further. Such a blatant oversight on the part of the journalists can only be deemed intentional, in order to further sensationalise the matter and present sharia law (and Islam and all Muslims by extension) as diametrically opposed to British mores.

Assumption 3: The growing influence of Islam on society (aka THIS IS JUST THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG! THE MUSLIMS ARE GOING TO TAKE OVER ENGLAND ONE TRIBUNAL AT A TIME!)
Though this assumption is less overt than the others, it does underlie a number of the articles above. In particular one writer goes so far to state “there are several radical Islamist movements that are working hard to spread Islamic supremacy through the use of terrorism, intimidation, litigation and disinformation campaigns… A parallel legal system utilizing Sharia courts is likely to constitute one step toward expanding political Islam, rather than serving as the final request for a religious accommodation.”

Firstly, MAT is not a “parallel” legal system but rather could at best be described as a subordinate one. Secondly, its not even a “legal system” but rather an alternative dispute resolution tribunal which utilises sharia law and English law to determine disputes. Additionally, considering it can only determine civil disputes and also operates within the ambit of English law it is difficult to see how it is the so-called first step in expanding political Islam. The writers’ position is also at odds with official statistics of the Muslim population in Britain. 2001 data suggests Muslims make up 2.8% of the population in the UK. Unless the Muslim community has seen exponential growth in the past 8 years to figures that overtake the Anglo population it is difficult to see how exactly the Muslims will take over and where the support for a religious theocracy in Britain will come from. At another point in the article the same writer states that the ultimate goal of sharia law is “to replace democracies with Islamic theocracies”. Last time I checked sharia was a system of law, not a coup de tat.

Such representations like this of British Muslims and Islam perpetuate the discourse of the Other. They present Islam and Muslims as a threat to British society which cannot be contained. Similarly, the journalists suggest Muslims are a foreign element to Britain because they want an entirely separate legal structure to the “rest” of society. This distinction infers that Muslims must give up all traces of their religion and culture to assimilate into British society and be accepted by the public.

So does this sound the end of one law for all? It probably does, but “one law” isn’t a term that could be used to describe any legal system for a while. There is ample evidence to suggest that in post-colonial times the colonial powers allowed multiple legal systems based on local custom and religion to operate. In countries like the UK Muslim minorities have had a problematic existence and establishing and retaining a ‘Muslim’ identity has been particularly contentious. Ultimately what the journalists fail to acknowledge is that MAT allows for the recognition of minority groups and operates as a powerful inclusion tool. Recognition of an individual’s personal culture or in this case religion is extremely important. Denying all or part of a minority culture has drastic negative effects for identity and feelings of belonging.

For more information on MAT, see here for an interview with Maryam Namazie from the One Law For All campaign and Aina Khan, a lawyer who argues for Sharia Law. And also here for a 30 min video Judge Qureshi of the MAT giving a speech in Manchester about forced marriages and the role of the MAT.

Islam, CEDAW and International Law

Farah

In the past few years I’ve noticed a disturbing trend. Now I don’t have a problem with trends. Trends are fun, they make me cool, and that means I can relate to the young people. The problem is with this new trend is that its called “Let’s Obsess about Human Rights.” The other problem with this trend is that every time it rears its god ugly head its accompanied by its really, really irritating friend “Don’t worry about engaging in critical dialogue with human rights because then you might just realise it’s a load of crap.” I don’t really have a problem with human rights in principle… alright, I do. Actually, this whole post is all about the main issue that I have with women’s rights in particular (codified in the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women – CEDAW). Specifically, the fact that international law is an ineffective tool within which to realise women’s rights, especially when in relation to Islamic states. There are two main issues which have not been wholly reconciled within the literature. With this limitations in mind, it is argued that norms and principles for the empowerment of women are more stable and fundamental when adopted freely from within the state. Any determined project for the empowerment of women must be addressed from a bottom-up approach.

Firstly, women’s rights discourse is rooted in western feminist’s assumption that the oppression of women in Islamic states is solely attributable to the culture and to Islam. They argue (in response to the concerns of cultural relativism) that basing rights discourse on differing cultural values will undermine women’s rights because certain ‘undesireable’ elements of the culture are antithetical to women’s rights. ‘Oppressive’ cultural practices must be rejected before progress can be achieved. This assumption that discrimination is rooted in culture is reflected in CEDAW at Article 5(a). It states:

5. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures:

(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices … and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women;

Blaming the culture undermines the substantial evidence that the disenfranchisement of women is rooted in economic and social conditions. (For a fuller discussion on this point I’ll direct you to read Sahar’s post “Women and Culture”) Within the context of CEDAW and international law it is important to note that this approach is attempting to initiate top-down ‘cultural’ change and ignores the wider economic and social problems which contribute to the injustices against women. What is needed is grass-roots change; Muslim women must examine the justifications for, and the extent to which, the system have been corrupted by the influence of colonialism and current social and political conditions. There are a number of contemporary Muslim women’s organisations that are actively engaging in such a dialogue. Their efforts in engaging with rights discourse on their own terms are hampered by Western feminists (and CEDAW) who insist on culture-blaming and thus deny the Muslim women her agency. At best, the role that treaties like CEDAW can play is as pieces of public persuasion that may help grass-roots activists and politicians eager to promote a process of domestic reform.

The next point that I think needs to be addressed a lot more critically within the literature on human rights is its status as international law. Regardless of what journalists love to claim when pointing fingers at other cultures, human rights is not customary international law and states are not under an obligation to protect and promote those rights. Additionally, enforcement of human rights is also an issue that needs to be addressed. It is difficult to use enforcement mechanisms available for breaches of international law to enforce breaches of human rights. The traditional rules regarding accountability, state responsibility and enforcement are based on essentially reciprocal rights and obligations like those found in international law generally. These enforcement mechanisms operate horizontally and are subject to the political will of individual states. Human rights discourse sits uneasily within this framework. Admittedly, there has been vigorous development of treaty-based human rights law, like CEDAW, which have specific committees to investigate claims of breaches brought by individuals. However, the treaty regime presents an ad-hoc approach to human rights which ultimately undermines its claims to ‘universality’. Additionally, access to those committees is contingent on states granting their citizens access. Individuals have no status in international law. The fundamental driving force in the development of all international law remains the sovereign State.

By highlighting the two issues above regarding women’s rights I have tried to establish that the protection of human rights is a process which depends largely upon strengthening internal institutions, structures and procedures for challenging violations and denials of rights. Governments must develop civil society to ensure that the social and economic conditions aid the enfranchisement of women. Empower grass-roots women’s rights organisations to re-interpret the role of women in their society. None of these happen over night. Change takes time. And even though time isn’t something that a lot of women have, for the rights to be meaningful and fundamental change to occur, people need to wait.