The Permission to Narrate

Sahar

Feminists Naomi Wolf and Philis Chesler have recently been debating the topic of the ‘veil’ and Muslim women. It’s become somewhat of a heated debate with both sides claiming they have a better insight into the lives of Muslim women. This audacious insight of course does not actually rely on actual engagement with Muslim women, nor the participation of Muslim women in this debate– aside from brief references that are then interpreted and made to make sense through the position of both women.

Just a brief overview of the debate first:  Wolf’s experience in Morocco led her to make the following claim that Muslim women are not necessarily restricted by their religious attire (chador and headscarf) and in fact feel liberated, especially sexually. From these observations, Wolf calls for a more nuanced approach in understanding women’s freedom. Chesler has responded with the charge that Wolf is legitimizing oppressive practices and responds with outrageous statements that conclude with the following: Muslim women are oppressed in Islamic attire, they lack agency, and the Western approach to liberation is more fitting.

What interested me was the assumption of these women to debate the issue of the hijab (whatever forms of it) and the experiences of Muslim women without involving a practicing Muslim woman who observes the hijab or at least be a part of the community and faith that practices it,  and thus be more qualified on the subject.

Wolf attempts to recognise the opinions of Moroccan women and speaks on their experiences, but her own understanding of Islam, Muslim women or even the subject of Muslim dress seems to be too difficult for her when she confuses Pakistani dress (‘shalwar kameez’) with Moroccan Islamic dress which can come in the form of niqaab, abaya, jilbaba or just modestly dressed in loose pants/skirt/top and a headscarf.  So Wolf not only ignores the differences in cultural dress—for the Muslim world is just one monolithic entity anyway– these differences don’t really exist and can all fall under the category of ‘traditional dress’ conveniently juxtaposed against Western ‘modern dress’. By wearing any traditional Muslim dress (‘shalwar kazmeez’), Wolf thinks she has direct access to the experiences of Muslim women. Dress therefore becomes the embodiment of Muslim women’s lives, and a way to access their world.

As for Chesler, she too does not have much credibility (not that she does in the first place considering her inane islamophobic and racist views on Palestinians and Muslims as a whole) when she declares that ‘most’ Muslim girls and women are not given a choice in wearing any Islamic dress.  She supports her claims by shamelessly citing two women (Hirsi Ali and Nouri Darwish) who have publicly renounced Islam and have built their careers on feeding Islamophobic hysteria in the West.  So Muslim women are spoken for either through an Islamophobic feminist or apostates who work for right-wing American think tanks bent on demonizing Muslims and Islam.

Putting these absurdities aside, I also find it telling how the debate treats Muslim women as objects in an exhibition, as spectacles, who function as objects to be analysed, observed, dissected, commented and repackaged to be easily consumed by a Western audience. Muslim women’s voices are only heard through interpretation of two white women (the subject) who assume the permission to narrate what it is like to be a Muslim woman who chooses to cover her head, in whatever form.

The alienness of Muslim culture is retold in the language of universalism (western norms and feminist ideals) to ease the anxiety of the Western observer towards difference. We see this in how Wolf insists that there are similar sentiments behind Islamic dress that Western feminists can relate to “This may not be expressed in a traditional Western feminist set of images, but it is a recognisably Western feminist set of feelings”.  Or in the intimacy of Muslim homes, the presence of designer labels like Victoria Secret is comforting. Muslim mores are measured against white Western standards and only legitimised and accepted once shared values and practices are recognised. To send the reassuring message: “see, they are just like ‘us’”.

The notion of white being a signifier of objectivity is imperative here. Wolf, like the colonial traveler, is an objective observer who can participate in the local customs and wear the traditional dress– yet can remain ‘detached’ from her surrounding in order to make perceptive observations that can be taken away for examination.  Thus, both women’s subjectivities as white, upper-middle class Western women are not called into question when they speak on behalf of Muslim women in this debate. It is in fact this same subjectivity that permits them to narrate for Muslim women.  They speak with an unquestionable authority as whiteness has a moral-worth of its own masquerading as universal and never questioned.

So it is not that Muslim women are silenced by her hijab, as many white  feminists like to claim, but because they are made to be silent by those who wish to speak for them.

Muslim women and choice in marriage

Sahar

Recently I saw the Doha Debates which is a show that debates controversial political, social and religious issues.  Journalist and mediator, Tim Sebastian proposes a motion and the speakers on the panel discuss the topic at length. The audience then has an opportunity to respond to the panel. The latest motion proposed was ‘This house believes that Muslim women should be free to marry anyone they choose’.

There were four speakers on the panel. For the motion there was American Muslim feminist Asra Nomani who has authored several books. Also for the motion, there was Dr. Muhammad Habash a Parliamentarian and Cleric.  Against the motion were Shaykh Yasir Qadhi and Dr. Thuraya Al Arrayed, a Saudi writer, columnist and member of the advisory board of the Arab Thought Foundation.

Nomani began the debate with an emotional tone, declaring that Muslim women face barriers and that “just about every Muslim woman” encounters these barriers and internalizes them, and that she does not have the right to choose when it comes to marriage. She then directly addresses Muslim women and reassures them that she doesn’t wish that they suffer forced or loveless marriages.

With the way Nomani is carrying on, you’d think she was convinced she was shaking the very sheltered world of Muslim women. Apparently we’re not aware of our rights!  In her self-aggrandising, Nomani homogenises Muslim women’s experience and assumes that every Muslim woman has had the same experience as her. That yes, we are all doomed to the same fate.  True, there are Muslim women like Nomani who marry either through some sort of coercion but just to keep their family happy–I also agree with her point that these women will be the ones who share their bed with their husbands at the end. However, Nomani seems to think that these experiences are the experiences of the vast majority of Muslim women–where we are helpless beings who are victims of our community and our imposing families who Nomani assumes don’t want the best for us. She thus undermines the importance of family within the context of Muslim marriage.  I’m not saying women have to follow the decisions of families but many women and men will be thinking that family does matter in many of the decisions we make for ourselves, including marriage.  In other words, choice comes with responsibility and it  does at times mean we consider everything, not just ourselves.

Nomani’s entire argument is predicated on a particular construction of the Muslim woman which she deploys to legitimise her claim: She is just chattel, in shackles, and silenced by her subjugation. Nomani belittles the minds of Muslim women because she assumes they lack agency of their own and cannot comprehend their supposed suffering.  In doing so, Nomani constructs herself as their savior, the enlightened one who recognises their oppression– the liberal light at the end of this oppressive dark tunnel that is their unfortunate experience.

I found it interesting that Nomani’s extremely liberal position was juxtaposed with the other Muslim woman who was opposed to the motion.  Dr. Al Arrayed opposes the motion because she believes that anyone 27 and under basis their decisions on physical attraction and that they are not responsible enough to be making important decisions like this– so the role of the family is essential.  Her simplistic position is mired by her lack of faith in young Muslim women and their responsible attitude to such issues like marriage—which a woman in the audience pointed out.  However, I do agree with Dr  Al Arrayed’s overall point that family is important in these decisions and it is dangerous to deny this reality because it could lead to women being isolated.   

What was interesting is the issue of children did not come up in the debate. For me, my decision to marry a Muslim man is affirmed when it comes to the faith of my children. I would not want my children to belong to any other faith but Islam. Keep in mind; this is not only an issue women who marry non-Muslims have to face but also men who do.

Supporting the motion, Dr. Habash, begins his defense declaring there is no compulsion in religion and so we should extend this to marriage too. (I think he was a little confused with his position and often would agree with the opposing side) However, no compulsion in religion does not mean a Muslim shouldn’t abide by the laws of her religion—she has the choice not to of course but if she wishes to practice her religion, there are certain rules and practices that need to be followed as part of worship.  Sure, a Muslim woman can marry who she wants, but the question here is, is there religious justification for this unlimited freedom?  Dr. Habash refers to the hadith of when the Prophet was approached by a woman who told him of how she was forced to marry but later agreed with her father’s decision. The Prophet then told her he’ll absolve the marriage but she assured him she was now happy in her marriage but wanted to let women know that the father has no right to do such a thing which the Prophet agreed.  Habash takes from this hadith the principle that women should be able to choose who she should marry, regardless of the faith of the person. However, as Shaykh Qadhi points out, we cannot be selective with our religion because Habash is ignoring what Islam has to say about a woman marrying a non-Muslim.  

As I listened to Nomani’s concern over the depressing fate of Muslim women, I thought, why isn’t she mentioning the importance of recognizing cultural ideas and customs that have infiltrated how we conceptualise and perceive Islam.? Her analysis was simple: Muslim women are downtrodden; there was no attempt to contextualise and understand this further.  To compensate for Nomani’s reductive observation, Shaykh Qadhi  (and Dr. Al Arrayed ) point out  that yes, there are women who are oppressed in our communities in the name of religion, but Islam is not responsible for any oppression that occurs, rather it is cultural and tribal prejudice which justify oppressive practices. These practices are the antithesis to Islam’s principles of equality and justice which are protected in its law. Importantly, Shaykh Qadhi explains how  this is not a problem of the uneducated In our community but those who have committed themselves to the study of religion, who may consciously or unconsciously introduce their own cultural prejudice that affects how they view Islam. This was imperative to the debate I thought because of the dichotomy that Nomani was desperately trying to establish.

Nomani was positing herself as the liberal defender of Muslim women against the oppressive religious leadership that Shaykh Qadhi—with his long beard (as opposed to the more subtle beard of Habash) represented.  When Shaykh Qadhi objected to her removal of any boundaries and warned that limitations are a part of our religion, she would turn to the audience and say “that is their interpretation” in her attempt to marginalise him. In fact, she was well prepared for this response and early on in the debate warned of the theological arguments that she claimed lay the barriers for women.

Shaykh Qadhi undermined this false dichotomy in pointing out that there are elements of the religious establishment who are tainted by cultural understandings and that we should resist this. However, Nomani wasn’t interested in hearing a Shaykh criticise women’s oppression in our community— that was simply not the role Nomani had decided for him.

Furthermore, Nomani seemed to think independent interpretations have more sway than scholarship consensus.  She fails to grasp the importance of having boundaries and unlimited freedom which any liberal will argue needs to be contextualized.  Nomani’s discrediting of scholarship reminds me of another Muslim journalist Irshad Manji who also has a similar position. I wrote about the dangers of such independent thinking divorced from engagement with Islamic scholarship and Sharia.  These women who have no credentials in such areas but have built careers by commenting on them–they differ from scholars like Amina Wadud and Fatima Mernissi who I am not necessarily agree with on many issues but I do respect their efforts to protect the rights of women by working within the traditional scholarship and delving into it to extrapolate their views. 

Like Manji, Nomani also legitimizes and justifies  her claim by making references to popular misconceptions of Islam in her quoting of Qur’anic verses out of their proper context: The supposed beating of women sanctioned in the Qur’an which Hamza Yusuf explains well here;  and forbidding friendship with Christians and Jews.  The latter she strategically mentioned because many would be aware of her friendship with Jewish journalist Daniel Pearl who was killed in Pakistan and thus admire her for not being the kind of Muslim she was painting those who disagree with her as.  Nomani’s use of these examples is not only offensive to Muslim women but also to their Islamic faith.  Nomani seems to think that this is an issue of a lack of liberty in Islamic understanding toward women but as Shaykh Qadir points out,  if we return to the Prophetic teaching in order to understand the status of women in Islam we will realize that our tradition is the place of vindication. The Prophetic period is where we can break away from a hermetic Islamic discourse and our cultural impinges on Islamic practices by looking at how women were a part of the political, economic and cultural community. The women of this period were successful business women (Khadija), scholars (Aisha), soldiers (Nuseiba) and specifically relevant to this debate is how Khadija herself had proposed to the Prophet. These men and women are models for the Ummah and aren’t understood as oppressed but liberated–they certainly do not fit into Nomani’s construction of Muslim women and Islam as a whole.

In the end, the motion was passed (62%). I was actually surprised but Shaykh Qadhi explains in his piece on the debate that it was likely to be because of the vagueness of the motion which stressed freedom to choose rather than Shariah ruling on the issue.  But the fact that these kinds of discussions are taking place between Muslims (both men and women)  is a step forward in providing a space to discuss issues that impact on the lives of Muslim women.

Britain, Sharia and Gutter Journalism

Farah

Recently the British have been all up in arms about the takeover of their just and equitable legal system with the oppressive and discriminatory behemoth of sharia law. Initially I wanted to focus on one article I found at the Guardian website but soon found multiple examples of the same gutter journalism. You can read more here and here, and here. And here’s another example of exemplary reporting. There’s nothing sensationalist or bigoted in them at all. Instead of addressing the articles separately, in this post I want to address some of the common arguments against the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) and suggest that they are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Tribunal itself, and the role of sharia within Islamic countries.

The first MAT in England was established in December 2007 and has since expanded to a number of other locations across the UK. MAT is a form of alternative dispute resolution. Instead of going to court Muslims who accept the jurisdiction of MAT can use it to resolve a number of civil disputes. There are two arbitrators present at all disputes: one Islamic scholar and the other a qualified solicitor or barrister. They will determine the dispute with a mix of English law and Sharia law. The tribunal operates within the UK’s existing legal system. This allows any determination of proceedings by MAT to be enforced through higher courts, and also preserves the right of parties to appeal to the High Court for review of an order. From their website the founders say that “MAT will therefore, for the first time, offer the Muslim community a real and true opportunity to settle disputes in accordance with Islamic Sacred Law with the knowledge that the outcome as determined by MAT will be binding and enforceable.”

Unfortunately for the campaigners against Sharia legal pluralism isn’t a brave new world. In the USA Native American tribes exercise exclusive criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed in tribal territory by tribal members (see here). Similar courts institutionalising indigenous justice operate in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Appearance before an indigenous court applies in strict circumstances and only to indigenous offenders. For England their experience with legal pluralism comes not with sharia but with Jewish Beth Din courts. The Jewish courts have been operating for close to 100 years and resolve a wide variety of civil disputes, including divorces. This prior experience however hasn’t restrained the sensationalism in the debate on the role of sharia within British law. Most notable of the backlash is the “One Law for All” campaign. You can read their petition here. (All I have to say is if Ayaan Hirsi Ali supports the cause then you should definitely get behind it).

Assumption 1: Discrimination (aka BUT THE WOMEN! THE WOMEN! THINK OF THE MUSLIM WOMEN WHO WILL SUFFER!)
The first reaction people typically have to sharia is that it discriminates against women. Such a system should not be established in the UK because it ‘clashes’ with women’s fundamental human rights. In her reaction to sharia in Britain Anjum Ahmed-Mouj states “Religious law, used without due regard to the relative powerlessness of women and children in society and without proper and transparent monitoring can be and is used to strengthen and extend the control and abuse perpetrated by individuals.” The problem is that this position presents sharia as a monolithic, static entity. However the development of sharia and women’s experience under it are more complex than that. Sharia differs greatly from country to country, interacting with influences like culture, globalisation and Westernisation which transform its practice and codification in different countries. This isn’t to deny that disempowered women suffer under sharia law; but solely blaming the religion undermines the fact that discrimination in the application of sharia is sourced from other areas which influence and drive the development of sharia in a certain direction. Within the context of MAT it is important to note the tribunal operates within English law. Parties have right of review and the decisions will be made with a mix of Islamic and English law.

With that in mind it becomes difficult to maintain that it is solely sharia, and MAT by extension, that presents the biggest hurdle to the empowerment of British Muslim women. Additionally, jumping to the worst case discrimination scenario denies the empowerment that MAT provides to all Muslims by providing avenues of cultural and social development. Such a move increases social cohesion by acknowledging the Muslim community and the role that such a large minority plays within the UK.

Assumption 2: The extremes of punishment under Sharia (aka LOOK AT WHAT THEY DO OVER IN [INSERT MUSLIM COUNTRY HERE] TO THEIR CRIMINALS! IT’S SO BARBARIC! WE’RE BRITISH! WE DON’T TORTURE!)
The second assumption a number of the articles make is in relation to how wrongs are punished under sharia law. One article above states that “In some Muslim countries punishments handed out under the legal system have included beheadings, public floggings and thieves’ hands being chopped off.” Well if they do that in some Muslim countries then you certainly can’t allow sharia in Britain! While the author doesn’t attempt to define the ‘some’, the point is that sharia is brutal and unjust in the punishment meted out to Muslim offenders. It is worth repeating here that such representations of punishment under sharia law again present it as a static construction, and a particularly violent one as well.

Within the context of MAT, such representations distort the power of the tribunal over what it can and cannot do. The tribunal cannot hear criminal law matters, nor can it impose any form of corporal punishment. It states this quite clearly on their website. Its power is limited to hearing civil disputes only, and issuing orders for compensation. The tribunal can adjudicate on cases of domestic violence within the context of family disputes. However, it is required to pass all details to the police who will then decide whether to take the matter further. Such a blatant oversight on the part of the journalists can only be deemed intentional, in order to further sensationalise the matter and present sharia law (and Islam and all Muslims by extension) as diametrically opposed to British mores.

Assumption 3: The growing influence of Islam on society (aka THIS IS JUST THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG! THE MUSLIMS ARE GOING TO TAKE OVER ENGLAND ONE TRIBUNAL AT A TIME!)
Though this assumption is less overt than the others, it does underlie a number of the articles above. In particular one writer goes so far to state “there are several radical Islamist movements that are working hard to spread Islamic supremacy through the use of terrorism, intimidation, litigation and disinformation campaigns… A parallel legal system utilizing Sharia courts is likely to constitute one step toward expanding political Islam, rather than serving as the final request for a religious accommodation.”

Firstly, MAT is not a “parallel” legal system but rather could at best be described as a subordinate one. Secondly, its not even a “legal system” but rather an alternative dispute resolution tribunal which utilises sharia law and English law to determine disputes. Additionally, considering it can only determine civil disputes and also operates within the ambit of English law it is difficult to see how it is the so-called first step in expanding political Islam. The writers’ position is also at odds with official statistics of the Muslim population in Britain. 2001 data suggests Muslims make up 2.8% of the population in the UK. Unless the Muslim community has seen exponential growth in the past 8 years to figures that overtake the Anglo population it is difficult to see how exactly the Muslims will take over and where the support for a religious theocracy in Britain will come from. At another point in the article the same writer states that the ultimate goal of sharia law is “to replace democracies with Islamic theocracies”. Last time I checked sharia was a system of law, not a coup de tat.

Such representations like this of British Muslims and Islam perpetuate the discourse of the Other. They present Islam and Muslims as a threat to British society which cannot be contained. Similarly, the journalists suggest Muslims are a foreign element to Britain because they want an entirely separate legal structure to the “rest” of society. This distinction infers that Muslims must give up all traces of their religion and culture to assimilate into British society and be accepted by the public.

So does this sound the end of one law for all? It probably does, but “one law” isn’t a term that could be used to describe any legal system for a while. There is ample evidence to suggest that in post-colonial times the colonial powers allowed multiple legal systems based on local custom and religion to operate. In countries like the UK Muslim minorities have had a problematic existence and establishing and retaining a ‘Muslim’ identity has been particularly contentious. Ultimately what the journalists fail to acknowledge is that MAT allows for the recognition of minority groups and operates as a powerful inclusion tool. Recognition of an individual’s personal culture or in this case religion is extremely important. Denying all or part of a minority culture has drastic negative effects for identity and feelings of belonging.

For more information on MAT, see here for an interview with Maryam Namazie from the One Law For All campaign and Aina Khan, a lawyer who argues for Sharia Law. And also here for a 30 min video Judge Qureshi of the MAT giving a speech in Manchester about forced marriages and the role of the MAT.

Beyond The Chador

Sahar

When I began writing my chapter for my thesis on Iran, I was immensely curious  of women’s situation  in  both pre-revolution Iran and post.  Images of chador-wearing women and angry protests on the streets of Tehran are how I visualised the Iranian revolution. Of course I was aware there was  more to it than that.  Though my focus was on the hijab, the hijab debate touched upon various issues affecting Iranian women and allowed me to explore women’s diverse experiences in the past century.  During what was called the ‘modernizing’ period of Iran, Iranian women became a centerpiece for Iranian modernizers (led by the Pahlavis) who saw her as the catalyst for change. Women were encouraged to wear Western dress, remove hijab, and mimic the Western woman. This strategy was employed because modernism had become synonymous with Westernism and Westernism with freedom.  Critics of the revolution have often compared this period to that of the post-revolution, in which they argue the Shah’s efforts to modernise Iran fostered the success of women’s rights and the public participation of women. The revolution, they claim, eroded these achievements. The chador is often deployed as a metaphoric description of the smothering of women’s achievements.  Western media has conveniently depicted the Iranian woman shrouded in a depressing dark chador– the symbol of Iran’s deprivation and women’s subjugation. Anything said in defense of the revolution, is immediately silenced by the ‘sinister’ presence of the chador.

However, after 30 years of the 1979 revolution, recent scholarship on Iranian women has shifted away from what I believe is a flawed dichotomy and looked at how women’s situation has changed dramatically in post-revolution Iran today.

One of such scholars is Janet Afary who will be visiting UCLA to talk about Sexual Politics in Modern Iran. Afary joins the voices of observers like Ziba Mir-Hosseini and Louise Halper who point out that there has been considerable improvement of Iranian women’s experiences since the revolution.

Little is said about the achievements  made by women in Iran.  The criticisms of the revolution are beginning to be unraveled.  Women’s role in the revolution politicized them in ways never seen before. The mass presence of Iranian women in the public streets of Tehran in the late 1970s was a break away from not only the Shah and SAVAK’s despotism and repression, but from the construction of the domesticated traditional Iranian woman.  The women who fought for the success of the revolution could not be told to get back in the kitchen. Ayatollah Khomeini himself was aware of this and encouraged women to join political organizations and encouraged their public participation. What must also be noted is during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, while Iran’s millions of men fought against Saddam’s forces, it was Iranian women who ran the country. This added to the importance of women’s historical role in Iran.  It changed the ‘traditional’ view of the Iranian woman who had ‘earned’ the right to have a place in serving Iran in multiple ways that went beyond domestic contributions.  During this period Khomeini stated,

Islam urges women to strive and reach perfection which has no limits, nor does it stop at any point and therefore has granted them the right to serve society as a scholar, inventor, philosopher, teacher, physician, or even an active politician. (quoted by Eniz Sanasarian, 1990)

As pointed out by Afary, the Shah’s policies towards women lacked real benefits for women who did not belong to the elite class.  Life for women in rural and traditional sectors of society did not change dramatically. For instance, literacy rates remained quite low; by 1976 around thirty five percent of women were literate. Further, by the 1970s, the labour force showed only real improvement in the upper classes.   So it was women of the upper classes who identified more with the Western world than the majority of Iranian society who were the receivers of the ‘modernising’ reforms. Considering the impressive efforts to transform Iran, such trends seem low and exclusive, an indication of an unsuccessful program.

As I argued in my thesis, under the ‘Islamic’ government, there has been a more productive focus on gender in ways that the Pahlavi regime had failed to achieve because of its inability to engage with grass root voices.  Since the revolution, there have been interesting improvements in the political, economic and social role of women. In 2004, twenty percent of Iranian labour force was women, which has increased by twenty percent since 1980 and more class inclusive.  The literacy rate in Iran has risen to seventy percent for female adults, compared to under fifty percent in the 1970s. In 2006 reports show well over half of Iranian university students were women. A third of all doctors, 60% of civil servants and 80% of all teachers are women. (see Zahedi, 2007 and Halper, 2005).

Those figures don’t exactly fit in with the negative impression Western media gives us of Iranian women.

Armed with the understanding that comes with higher education, contributing to the economy and a history of being part of the revolution, women have driven a reformist discourse in order to influence the state’s interpretation of Islamic gender roles. For example, Maryam Gorji, a representative in the Islamic Parliament is engaged in writing a woman-centered (re)interpretation of women’s images in the Qur’an. Women like Gorji now seek what they call ‘gender fairness’ in the new state.  The achievements of women like Zahra Rahnavard, who has a Ph.D in political science and became the first women to hold the position of university chancellor in post-revolution Iran demonstrates the kind of success that women are achieving in Iran.

This is not to say there haven’t been disadvantages for women in post-revolution Iran.  However, my point is in line with Afary, who sees the importance in shedding light on some positive effects of the revolution. To suggest that the revolution has brought on nothing but catastrophic consequences for women is misleading and dangerous. Such a simplistic analysis contributes to not only the demonisation of Iran, but reinforces the orientalist stereotypes of Muslim women lacking agency against the brute force of Islam’s supposed misogyny.

In reality, Iranian women from all classes have been politicized. Women’s mass contribution in Iranian society in the past two decades has legitimized their role in the future of Iran.  They have founded their own organizations, study groups; associations and publications. They have marked their own space in politics and contribute to the country in ways that women under the Pahlavi regime could not possibly have done so. This is because the Shah’s policies  openly called for a westernisation of Iran and discredited.

So contrary to how they are perceived in mainstream media and even academic scholarship, Iranian women are far from the silent victims of a religious establishment.